Fem IR Neg Supplement

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# Links

## IR / Generic

### **Chivalric IR Link**

The aff relies on narratives of chivalry that positions the USFG as a masculine savior vis-à-vis the feminized post-colonial subjects in need of rescue from their own native backwardness – this locks in colonial hierarchies of value

Kaplan 2002 (Amy, academic in American Studies, focusing on the critical study of the culture of [imperialism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperialism), prison writing, mourning, memory, and war; Professor of English at U Penn. *The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture,* Harvard University Press (Print Book); pages 105-110; spp)

Just as political power is reinforced abroad by being renounced, the main character can best prove his masculinity outside his national boundaries. The hero of Soldiers of Fortune becomes the ideal American man by virtue of his homelessness; his sentimental attachment to a home is really to the grave of his filibustering father. He divides the work months of the year between construction (as engineer) and destruction (as mercenary) in the outposts of the European empires, and then takes his vacation in Vienna, where he goes to imbibe high civilization. When Clay is saluted by an American marine at the end, he says proudly, “I have worn several uniforms since I was a boy, but never that of my own country” (335). It is striking that this representative American never lives there. Yet this absence, this refusal of national dress or place, makes him more authentically American than the uniformed marine by rendering his nation’s qualities universal and self-evident in his own body. The male hero’s escape from domesticity makes the entire world a potential home and quells its menacing foreignness. In these novels of the 1890s, masculinity has a function similar to the “manifest domesticity” we saw in Chapter 1. The self-contained white male body is delineated by its rejection of feminization and racial otherness, but it is mobile and flexible enough to make itself at home anywhere in the world.

Only in the release from geographic bounds can the United States secure the borders of its own identity. And this escape to a distant frontier is nostalgic in that it allows the American man to return home by becoming more fully himself. If Olancho and Graustark are escapes, they magically reopen that world which Strong sees closing down, a composite world of old and new, of barbarism and civilization, an “expectant world,” in Canby’s words, awaiting an influx of U.S. might. Fantasies indeed, these novels enact the desire for infinite expansion without colonial annexation, total control through the abdication of political rule, the detachment of national power from geographical boundaries.

The Embodied Man and the New Woman[:] Masculinity freed of national boundaries at first glance appears a purely corporeal identity, materialized through the immersion in primal violence, as Jackson Lears has argued. The heroes’ actions in these novels, however, juxtapose violent demonstrations of brut strength and a chivalric dedication to women, a commitment that sometimes leads to the renunciation of fighting in favor of love. When the hero of Soldiers of Fortune rides off with his beloved during a battle, he remarks, “I had forgotten. They have been having a revolution here” (306). He asserts his manliness through this nonchalance toward the male sphere of war, just as he asserts his Americanness by disavowing a uniform. Furthermore, this renunciation enhances his control by rendering the indigenous revolution as insignificant background to his declaration of love.

Many of these novels implicitly tell the story of defeating a nationalist revolution by displacing this conflict onto the more overt lot of rescue, in which the hero saves the heroine from her own environment. The romance splits the subjects of imperial power into gendered positions in which the heroine plays the part of the good Indian, siding with the forces of progress, while her male counterparts resist as brutal savages. In fact, the measure of their barbarism, like that of the ancient Hawaiians in Twain’s writing, lies in their mistreatment of women. Both the awkwardness and the allure of exotic cultures stem from their worship of women as objects of chivalric adoration on the one hand, and the women’s role as chattel to be married off for political alliances on the other. The liberator frees the heroine from her outdated role as item of exchange for a barbaric institution that makes “marriageable women but commodities in statecraft,” as Major put it (148). The hero undermines the feudal order and supplants it with his own chivalry by liberating the heroine from this bondage. He enacts the point Theodore Roosevelt made in 1910, for example, when he lectured to Egyptian Moslems about the Christian respect for women as a mark of superior civilization – or its absence – can be measured by the domestic status accorded women.

The women who are liberated in these novels have already in a sense saved themselves; by virtue of their love for the hero they have proven themselves ahead of their time. Cast in the role of the New Woman – independent, self-reliant, and adventurous – they often disguise themselves as men to plot the escape scenes, which the heroes obediently act out. The heroine of Richard Carvel saves the hero from death in a British prison by disguising herself as a beggar. Even the heroine of The Virginian, a New England schoolmarm, rescues the self-reliant hero from the wilderness, where he is left wounded after a fight with Indians. The heroine’s strong-willed passion, individualism, and activism show her out of place in her feudal or genteel environment. Mary Tudor of Knighthood is described similarly as a self-willed “girl pitted against a body of brutal men, two of the rulers of the two greatest nations on earth – rather heavy odds, for one woman” (137). But Mary does beat the odds and marries Brandon through her own machinations, with which he passively complies. Yet rather than run away together to New Spain, as she had planned, her male disguise is exposed, and this “sweet willful Mary” voluntarily “dropped out of history; a sure token that her heart was her husband’s throne; her soul his empire; her every wish his subject, and her will, so masterful with others, the meek and lowly servant of her strong but gentle lord and master” (248). Marriage is described here not simply in the rhetoric of political conquest, as we might expect, but in the language of political collaboration, the language of desire. Voluntarily chosen by the woman, rather than forcibly imposed, marriage represents the modern alternative to both empire and revolution.

The New Woman thus becomes a figure for imperial subjects of the New Empire. The heroines prove their own modernity by at once feeing themselves from traditional hierarchies and voluntarily subduing themselves to some “real live man,” just as imperial subjects, like the loyal Olanchan general in Soldiers of Fortune, prove their capacity from liberation through their alliance with American power. The romance heroine plays a role like that described by Frantz Fanon: “In the colonialist program, it was the woman who was given the historic mission of shaking up the Algerian man.” The romance heroines go one step further in imperialist fantasy; they eclipse and supplant their colonized male counterparts.

In American mythology, this female role replays the Pocahontas myth, which was undergoing a revival in the popular culture of the 1890s. In To Have and To Hold, Pocahontas is a constant allusive presence (after her death); her husband, Rolfe, is a companion of the hero, and her brother, a noble savage gracefully embracing his own doom, aids the British settlers in the final destruction of Indian resistance and thus the founding of the colony. In the figures of Pocahontas and white heroines, these novels represent the female desire to be liberated from feudal and traditional bonds as the desire to subjugated to modern power. In 1899 Schurman Commission in the Philippines noted a similar desire in eroticized terms: “The very thing they yearn for is what of all others our Government will naturally desire to give them.” Such a perfect fit is imagined between conqueror and conquered to erase any trace of conflict. Yet in the novels, this female desire to be liberated contains a potential threat to the man who saves her. “Such a woman as Mary” in Knighthood is called “dangerous, except in a state of complete subjection – but she was bound hand and foot in the silken meshes of her own weaving” (248). If these meshes are self-designed, can they be torn at will? That is the lurking threat in the fantasy of imperial collaboration; the position of the hero a chivalrous rescuer makes him curiously dependent on maintaining the desire of his female subject.

The heroine, as a composite figure, has at least a double function: she feminizes colonial subjects and masculinizes American women. In the first case, the plot of rescue may shed light on a phenomenon often noted by historians, the abrupt shift in the American image of the Cubans and, to a lesser extent, the Filipinos, from heroic revolutionaries (before the U.S. entry into the war against Spain) to bedraggled “unmanly” bandits unworthy of their American allies. When gender is taken into account in the narrative of rescue, this shift seems less extreme. Tales abounded in the popular press of outrages perpetrated by the Spanish against Cuban women, as in the alleged strip searches on the U.S. ship, Olivette, or in the celebrated case of Evangelina Cosio y Cisneros, the “Cuban Joan of Arc,” a member of the prominent Cuban family who was imprisoned on suspicion of aiding the revolutionaries. The press virtually scripted the case as a romance novel, claiming that she had been imprisoned for resisting the lustful advances of a Spanish officer. Hearst’s New York Journal launched an extensive letter-writing campaign on her behalf and then sent reporter Karl decker, in the role of knight errant, to rescue her (he staged it as a prison break, but accomplished it behind the scenes through bribes). This case enlisted the support of many readers from women’s organizations; one wrote to the Journal that the episode reminded her “of the chivalry of the knights of old, who rescued damsels in distress.” As the Journal noted in its book-length history of the case, “As in the old Romances, there is no uncertainty as to which way our sympathies should turn.” The rescue of a captive Cuban woman served as a symbol for the entire Cuban nation – a connection made explicitly in the press: “We have freed one Cuban girl – when shall we free Cuba?”

If the entry into the war was viewed as a chivalric rescue mission, then it is unsurprising that the Cubans and Filipinos could not be represented as men acting with autonomous agency or that they were viewed by Americans as lacking the “qualities which make for manhood.” Not only did the conditions of guerrilla warfare shatter the image of the heroic soldier Americans expected to find, as historians have argued, but the feminized view of the Cubans as welcoming damsels in distress did not allow the Americans to represent them as subjects acting on their own behalf. In a related context, President McKinley justified the war against the Filipinos by chastising them for not acquiescing to the role of the rescued: “It is not a good time for the liberator to submit important questions concerning liberty and government to the liberated while they are engaged in shooting down their rescuers. To be liberated, according to McKinley, meant, as it does in romances, to submit to being rescued, not to make claims for self-government.

### Link Turns Case

Link alone turns the case – Chivalry requires the constant creation of new wars to cohere and secure the value of warfare

Kaplan 2002 (Amy, academic in American Studies, focusing on the critical study of the culture of [imperialism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperialism), prison writing, mourning, memory, and war; Professor of English at U Penn. *The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture,* Harvard University Press (Print Book); pages 122-123; spp)

What Virginaia Woolf wrote of books, that they “continue each other,” can also be said of wars: wars continue each other. Wars generate and accumulate symbolic value by reenacting, reinterpreting, and transposing the cultural meanings of prior wars. The Leopard’s Spots dramatizes a popular representation of the Spanish-American War as a continuation and resolution of the Civil War, as its purgative final battle. Politicians and journalists represented the war with Spain as a nostalgic recovery of the heroism of an earlier generation, and as an antidote that could heal the wounds and divisiveness of the internecine war. If the hundred-day brevity of the later conflict counteracted interminable length of the earlier one, the international war also promised to reunify the nation by bringing together the North and the South against a common external enemy. Moreover, new battlefields abroad reputedly restored health and vigor to the male body, so massively dismembered in the war between the states. As the preface to a Civil War novel published in 1898 states: “on the heights of the Santiago we see men of the South standing shoulder to shoulder with men of the North, mingling their blood victoriously under the old Flag, while the world looks on with admiration not unmixed with fear.” The male body became the symbolic medium for national restoration, as “the heritage of American manhood” represented the common ground between previously warring factions.

## Space

### Link – Securing Space

#### Securitization of space is rooted in realist and masculinist politics, justified by the enlightened will to know, dominate, and colonize

Griffin, 2009 (Penny, PhD and professor in the dept of politics and IR, Univ New South Wales, “The spaces between us: the gendered politics of outer space,” in *Securing Outer Space,* Routledge, p. 68-69; spp)

This ‘warfighting’ discourse is not, of course, the only construction of outer space to possess discursive currency in the US. ‘Space exploration’, as Crawford argues, ‘is inherently exciting, and as such is an obvious vehicle for inspiring the public in general, and young people in particular’ (2005: 258). Viewed predominantly as a natural extension to the so-called evolution of military and commercial ‘arts’ in the Western hemisphere, human, technological expansion into outer space is justified in terms of scientific, commercial, and military global entrepreneurship. Conquering the final frontier of outer space is increasingly seen as crucial to a state’s pre-eminence in the global economy (cf. ‘Joint Vision 2020’). International alliances in the post-Fordist economy ‘have already consolidated the decision for future space exploration and colonization’ (Casper and Moore 1995: 315). In a particularly dramatic turn of phrase, Seguin argues that [m]ankind [sic] now stands at the threshold of long-duration space habitation and interplanetary travel’ (2005: 980). Similarly, Manzey describes human missions to Mars less as contingent future events, but as the inevitable consequences of technological progress (Manzey 2004: 781-790). Space, once defined as a power-laden site of Cold War military conflict, has also become a site of international political and economic cooperation. Often conceptualized in expansionist terms, as that which will make our world bigger, with space ‘discovery’ expanding human knowledge, space is also conceived of as that which will make the world smaller, in neo-liberal globalization terms, ‘by reconfiguring capitalism and nationalism’ (Casper and Moore 1995: 315). The US ‘warfighting’ discourse is also at odds with much so-called ‘space law’, in particular the Outer Space Treaty (1967), which defines space as the ‘province of all mankind’ and asks that states act ‘with due regard to the corresponding interests of States Parties to the Treaty’ (Brearly 2005: 16-17). Within the US itself, congressionally-led efforts to discuss and minimize the threats posed by human-made debris caught in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), of which there is somewhere in the region of 2,300 metric tons (ibid.: 9), appear ill-matched with any clear efforts by US government to increase the weaponization of space. The US cooperates, to a limited extent, in perpetuating a sustainable space environment for its satellite-based systems, to which space debris undoubtedly poses a threat, because of this direct individual benefit to US commercial interests. The US refuses, however, to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), prohibiting all use of nuclear weapons in space, since this constitutes a restriction of its ability to develop and test ‘new’ weapons. US critics of the CTBT contend that ratifying the treaty would ‘undercut confidence in the US deterrent’ and thus increase ‘the incentive for rogue states to obtain nuclear weapons’ (Medalia 2006: 13). All this is not to argue that dominant ‘scientific’ and ‘commercial’ justifications for space exploration, which are perhaps less overtly related to the militarization of space (for example, concerning advances in medicine, molecular and cellular biology, geology, weather forecasting, robotics, electronics and so on), do not in their basic assumptions also embody a gendered sense of ‘man’s natural right to colonize so-called unknown territory (see, e.g. Morabito 2005). The ‘quest for knowledge’ remains deeply embedded in Western accounts of the need for space colonization (as Bush’s 2004 speech makes clear), rationalized from humanity’s so-called ‘natural’ desire to explore and conquer (cf. Bush 2004; Crawford 2005; Mendell 2005). Crawford in proposing a case for the ‘scientific and social’ importance of human space exploration, suggests that, there are reasons for believing that as a species Homo sapiens is genetically predisposed towards exploration and the colonization of an open frontier. Access to such a frontier, at least vicariously, may be in some sense psychologically necessary for the long-term wellbeing of human societies. (Crawford 2005: 260)

#### US space discourse reproduces heteronormativity and masculine dominance

Griffin, 2009 (Penny, PhD and professor in the dept of politics and IR, Univ New South Wales, “The spaces between us: the gendered politics of outer space,” in *Securing Outer Space,* Routledge, p. 59; spp)

This chapter is about sex, but not the sex that people already have clarity about. ‘Outer space’ as a human, political domain is organized around sex, but a ‘sex’ that is tacitly located, and rarely spoken, in official discourse. The politics of outer space exploration, militarization and commercialization as they are conceived of and practiced in the US, embody a distinction between public and private (and appropriate behaviours, meanings and identities therein) highly dependent upon heteronormative hierarchies of property and propriety. The central aim of this chapter is to show how US outer space discourse, an imperial discourse of technological, military and commercial superiority, configures and prescribes success and successful behaviour in the politics of outer space in particularly gendered forms. US space discourse is, I argue, predicated on a heteronormative discourse of conquest that reproduces the dominance of heterosexual masculinity(ies), and which hierarchically orders the construction of other (subordinate) gender identities. Reading the politics of outer space as heteronormative suggests that the discourses through which space exists consist of institutions, structures of understanding, practical orientations and regulatory practices organized and privileged around heterosexuality. As a particularly dominant discursive arrangement of outer space politics, US space discourse (re)produces meaning through gendered assumptions of exploration, colonization, economic endeavour and military conquest that are deeply gendered whilst presented as universal and neutral. US space discourse, which dominates the contemporary global politics of outer space, is thus formed from and upon institutions, structures of understanding, and practical orientations that privilege and normalize heterosexuality as universal. As such, the hegemonic discursive rationalizations of space exploration and conquest (re)produce both heterosexuality as ‘unmarked’ (that is, thoroughly normalized) and the heterosexual imperatives that constitute suitable space-able people, practices, and behaiviours.

### Link – Space Wars

#### The AFF’s participation in the space race is based in a fear of weakness, softness, and lack – sustains the devaluement of the feminine other to assert global power

Griffin, 2009 (Penny, PhD and professor in the dept of politics and IR, Univ New South Wales, “The spaces between us: the gendered politics of outer space,” in *Securing Outer Space,* Routledge, p. 63-64, spp)

As critics increasingly condemned Eisenhower’s apparently passive and unconcerned leadership for being ‘old-fashioned’ and ‘out of touch’ (McDougall 1985:7), a particular political discourse began to emerge in the US, founded on a certain type of sexual metaphor and the assertion of virile, heterosexual masculinity, led by Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. These were both men heavily indoctrinated into the myths and ethos of patriotic frontier masculinity, and who placed at the heart of their politics the virtue of capturing the New Frontier. This reshaping of masculinity, alluding to the ‘pioneer’ adventurers of the old ‘Wild West’ but heavily predicated on mastering the technologies of space exploration, rejected the apparent discoordination of the private sector and the stagnancy of consumerism that, many believed, had caused complacency and heaped embarrassment on the US. Just as the American West had signaled freedom and a virile optimism to expansive, US frontier masculinity (see Hooper 2001: 68-69), so the conquest and colonization of space provided a suitably challenge-filled outlet to revive the frustrated masculinity of late 1950s America. In all this, US political discourse was fueled by a fear of emasculation through Soviet achievement and a national paranoia that the US might be perceived, by others and itself, as in any sense weak, complacent, showing any kind of ‘missile gap’, or aspect of ‘lack’. Eisenhower’s more careful and restrained approach was quickly replaced with Kennedy’s cult of masculine prowess, a career premised, as Dean articulates, on an ‘ideology of masculinity’ constructed around culturally resonant images of the ‘stoic warrior-intellectual’ (Dean 2001: 169). The late 1950s was period of massive US self-doubt, propelled by what Michaud refers to as ‘a surge of discourses on emasculation and feminized conformity’ (2005: 4). Kennedy’s assertion (written in *The Nation,* before he announced he was to run for his party’s nomination to presidential candidate), that the US had ‘gone soft” physically, mentally, spiritually soft’; that the US was ‘in danger of losing our will to fight, to sacrifice, to endure’’ and that the ‘slow corrosion of luxury is beginning to show’, found great sway across America, an assertion, as Dean illustrates, of manly strength against feminized weakness, youth against age, stoic austerity against debilitating luxury (2001: 170). Kennedy’s immediate focus on the ‘space gap’ signaled the announcement of a more militaristically virile engagement. Space exploration thus became a central policy tenet of the Kennedy government, with the operation to get a US astronaut on the Moon a means of reasserting US authority and avenging any doubts as to the administration’s ability to perform. While the USSR operated a single military space programme, tending to classify many of the (at least earlier) processes of its development of space technology, the US elected a different approach, one that intentionally and actively separated the public and private of space colonization through the creation of so-called ‘civilian’ programmes (ostensibly, more open to the public) run by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), such as the Apollo 11 mission to the Moon, and the more secretive ‘military’ space agencies run by the Department of Defense (DoD) (operating both ‘classified’ and ‘unclassified’ operations).

### Link – Space Awareness/Observation

#### Space Awareness both presumes and reinforces a hegemonic and masculine Cartesian subject

Deerfield, 2016. (Kat, PhD in Critical and Cultural Theory, Cardiff University UK, “Heavenly Bodies: Gender and Sexuality in Extra-Terrestrial Culture,” Dissertation, <http://orca.cf.ac.uk/93157/> spp)

As I argue, the positioning of the astronaut as a scientific and exploratory figure is integrally linked to the positioning of this figure’s perspective, both literal and metaphorical. Much of the discourse of space culture is centred on the experiences of astronauts looking from space at Earth, an experience which evokes issues of the geographic and cartographic subject. For this reason, I contend that analysis of spatial subjectivity is a productive contribution to analysis of the influence of gender on space culture. To analyse this, I will employ work from spatial theory on observation, perspective, and the geographic and cartographic subject. Gillian Rose’s *Feminism and Geography: The Limits of Geographical Knowledge* forms an important part of my analysis, as does the work of Kathleen M. Kirby.1 Theoretical Grounding[:]Rose’s *Feminism and Geography* is a detailed account of the influence of gendered ideology in the discipline of geography. As such, Rose’s work seeks not the geographic distribution of women, nor even women’s use of space, but the underlying structural limitations which have historically led to the privileging of a male subject in spatial theory.2 Rose explains that her focus is not on ‘the geography of gender, but [...] the gender of geography’, a concept to which I will pay more critical attention later in this chapter.3 I argue that Rose’s work has important implications for the analysis of gendered structures in work on outer space. Kirby’s work on the cartographic subject similarly illuminates the underlying gendered structure of the field itself. Her ‘Re:Mapping Subjectivity: Cartographic Vision and the Limits of Politics’ expands upon broader scholarship on the hegemonic construction of the Cartesian subject to examine the spatial aspect of the development of this subject. This development, Kirby argues, ‘was – and continues to be – inextricably tied to a specific concept of space and the technologies invented for dealing with that space’.4 Kirby explores this concept through analysis of Enlightenment perspectives on the bounded self – the border between inner, bodily space, and the spaces outside.5 Kirby explores the construction of this border through analysis of the discourse of cartography and the concept of ‘getting lost’. Kirby argues that ‘getting lost’ is a violation of the strict boundary between bodily interior and exterior for the cartographic subject, and further, this has important gendered implications which construct this subjectivity as a masculine one.6 Both Rose and Kirby pay attention to questions of perspective in their studies of spatial theory, and it is these questions to which I dedicate this chapter. As I will show, the perspective of an astronaut looking back at Earth is an important construction within human spaceflight.7 This construction is part of what leads me to analyse these texts from the perspective of earthbound spatial theory. I will further argue, using work by David Harvey on the origins of modern mapping, that the perspective that an astronaut possesses – that of an observer fully separated from the Earth itself – is not a new concept in spatial theory.8 Harvey argues that Western spatial discourse has privileged extra-terrestrial perspective since long before humans travelled into space. He describes the importance of this exact perspective in the development of Renaissance mapping, and its roots in Ptolemaic thought: [...] in designing the grid in which to locate places, Ptolemy had imagined how the globe as a whole would look to a human eye looking at it from outside. A number of implications then follow. The first is an ability to see the globe as a knowable totality. [...] A second implication is that [...] it seemed as if space, though infinite, was conquerable and containable for purposes of human occupancy and action.9 Harvey argues that the very foundations of modern mapping can be traced to the concept that the ideal observer is one entirely separate from Earth, so that he can see and know every part of the planet. I refer to this figure as *he* knowingly, for as I will further explore using the work of Rose and Kirby, this construction of a detached observer is associated with masculine subjectivity. In this chapter I analyse cultural artefacts which span a fairly broad cross-section of space culture, including narratives of astronaut experience, philosophical work on astronautic vision, and some visual corporate branding from the commercial space company Virgin Galactic. I use my chosen theoretical texts to illustrate how gender, spatiality, and perspective inform the discourse around spaceflight at multiple sites within space culture. I argue that ultimately, the perspective occupied by astronauts is one that is so key to development of Western spatial theory that this perspective is not extricable from the historical male dominance of all of Western spatial thought.

#### Space observation is the male gaze – masculine astronauts are observers with agency whereas the feminine is observable

Deerfield, 2016. (Kat, PhD in Critical and Cultural Theory, Cardiff University UK, “Heavenly Bodies: Gender and Sexuality in Extra-Terrestrial Culture,” Dissertation, <http://orca.cf.ac.uk/93157/> spp)

As I will show, much of space discourse assumes that viewing the earth from outside it is a new phenomenon, unique to the field of spaceflight. Frank White’s book *The Overview Effect: Space Exploration and Human Evolution* is a prominent investigation of the importance ascribed to astronautic vision in contemporary culture, although, as I will argue, White’s perspective is uncritical of this importance.10 White suggests that the experience of seeing Earth from a truly outside perspective is a new stage in human cultural evolution, and that this has a far- reaching, positive impact upon the development of human consciousness. Further, he claims that a perspective of Earth from space will lead people to ‘take for granted philosophical insights that have taken those on Earth thousands of years to formulate’, because their extra- terrestrial perspective will so deeply impact upon their ‘mental processes and views of life’.11 However, as I will show, the idealisation of an outside perspective on the Earth is not unique to the discourse of spaceflight. Further, I argue that its deep historical roots in the development of spatial subjectivity suggest that it is not, as White argues, inherently progressive. Toward this point, I will argue that the historical construction of extra-terrestrial perspective in geography and cartography relates to the gendered construction of the spatial subject, as identified by Rose and Kirby. As a further example of the effects of the discourse of astronaut perspective, I also analyse a creative image from the space industry: the image of a fictional woman astronaut, ‘Galactic Girl’, part of the visual branding of Virgin Galactic’s space tourism programme. In analysing this image, I will engage further with Rose’s work on gendered aspects of subjectivity, specifically within the context of astronautics. As I discussed in the Introduction, the incorporation of visual artefacts is an important aspect of my method of analysis, and Galactic Girl is a particularly interesting example in that it is situated firmly within the space industry. I discussed in Chapter Two how the lines between art and spaceflight can be unclear, and with Galactic Girl I maintain that as part of the design of spacecraft, this is an example of both how these lines can be blurred and how such artefacts can be an important part of a critical analysis of the broader culture of spaceflight. While I argue that aspects of astronaut experience problematize ideas of subjectivity and gaze for all astronauts (a topic to which I will return in Chapter Four), I further argue that the figure of the female astronaut represents a particular challenge to idealised subjectivity. In analysing the image of Galactic Girl, I aim to demonstrate how symbolism of women in space illustrates the impact of the ‘male gaze’ in the discourse of astronaut subjectivity.12 I argue that Rose’s discussion of a spatialised construction of masculine observer and feminine observee is represented in the discourse and visual culture of the space industry, particularly where gender is foregrounded. In exploring this figure I will additionally draw upon Debra Benita Shaw’s analysis of ‘The Space Suit as Cultural Icon’.13 Using Shaw’s work on space suits and the surrounding culture of spaceflight, I argue that the contrasts between real images of astronauts and the idealised image of Galactic Girl highlight the problematic nature of women in the popular discourse of spaceflight. I further argue that functional aspects of astronaut dress, particularly the space helmet, are symbolic of an unmarked, non-corporeal subject, and thus an idealised possessor of masculine gaze as identified by Rose.

### Link – Objective Knowledge of Space

#### Knowledge of and from space is part of an enlightenment project which privileges the white masculine perspective and violently crowds out all others

Deerfield, 2016. (Kat, PhD in Critical and Cultural Theory, Cardiff University UK, “Heavenly Bodies: Gender and Sexuality in Extra-Terrestrial Culture,” Dissertation, <http://orca.cf.ac.uk/93157/> spp)

The concept that Rose employs of the ‘master subject’ of geographical knowledge is an important basis for my theoretical approach. Donna Haraway elucidates the meaning of this figure in her ‘Situated Knowledges’, in which Haraway describes it as possessing a ‘cyclopian, self-satiated eye’.15 As Haraway argues, the construction of the ‘master subject’ as the possessor of exhaustive and objective scientific knowledge is limited both in that it is imbued with a particular race (white) and gender (male) and also in that the goal of exhaustive objectivity is not achievable.16 Haraway claims that ‘only partial perspective promises objective vision’.17 In ‘Situated Knowledges’, Haraway calls for a feminist reclamation of the concepts of vision and perspective. Haraway argues that such reclamation can reincorporate the corporeality and the diversity of experience from which the ‘master subject’ of traditional scientific perspective attempts to distance itself. As I will explore later in this chapter, the perspective of spaceflight provides both examples of the construction of the ‘master subject’, and also opportunities to destabilise this concept, which I argue can contribute to the Haraway’s project of ‘Situated Knowledges’. Rose’s *Feminism and Geography* further elaborates on the way the ‘master subject’ figure has impacted upon the development of geography and the geographic subject. Toward this end, in *Feminism and Geography* Rose makes a clear and succinct statement of her approach as one which concerns the gender *of* geography, rather than the subject of gender within traditional geographic discourse.18 In other words, Rose is interested in analysing the discipline itself for gendered attributes, not using the discipline as its stands to discuss gender issues. This is an important distinction not only for this chapter, but also for all that follows it, as I will discuss in my introduction to Part Two. For the purposes of this chapter however, it is particularly important because it relates to Rose’s further discussion of the ‘master subject’ of the geographic discipline. **Rose and the Gender *of* Geography[:]** In applying the concept of the ‘master subject’ to geography specifically, Rose illuminates how the field itself has insidiously privileged one particular perspective at the expense of all others. The key problem with this which Rose identifies is the construction of all perspectives, save the privileged ‘master subject’, as primarily characterised by their difference from the norm. Rose defines this subject in relation to geography as ‘a white, bourgeois, heterosexual man’, who, in the development of the discipline, sought primarily to ‘render the world amenable to the operation of masculinist reason’.19 The ideal of this geographic ‘masculinist reason’ is a way of knowing, and a knowledge, which can be generally applied. Rose writes: ‘Geographers desire knowledge of the whole world, but, more importantly for their claims to power through knowledge, they also desire a whole knowledge of the world.’20 This ‘knowledge of the whole world’ has clear implications for spaceflight; for, as I will discuss further in this chapter, what better way to see the whole Earth than to see it from outer space? The goal of ‘whole knowledge of the world’ reveals the privileging of one, unmarked perspective; through the construction of the ‘master subject’, this can only ever be a masculine perspective, and a perspective which intrinsically denies the value of any other.21 I argue that both of these aspects of what Rose terms ‘masculinist reason’ have important implications for analyses of the discourse of spaceflight. This also has a clear relationship to Harvey’s claim about ‘the globe as a knowable totality’. Taking both Harvey and Rose into account along with Haraway, it is clear that the subjectivity which seeks what Rose calls ‘knowledge of the whole world’ and ‘whole knowledge of the world’ is historically coded as a masculine subject. That the perspective granted to an extra-terrestrial observer is discussed in such similar ways as the traditional construction of geographic subjectivity contributes, I argue, to the male dominance of human spaceflight. In addition, in Rose’s work on the history of the masculinist geographic subject, she argues that ‘denial of...corporeality’ is central to the subject’s self-definition. As she further argues, this denied corporeality is applied to the construction of the Other, including women, and the denial functions to reinforce the masculinity of this subject.22

### Link – Space Colonization

#### The drive to colonize space is disguised within the language of universal humanity, but it priveleges a particularly classed male body – the AFF replicates the normalization of masculine power in space

Griffin, 2009 (Penny, PhD and professor in the dept of politics and IR, Univ New South Wales, “The spaces between us: the gendered politics of outer space,” in *Securing Outer Space,* Routledge, p. 70-71; spp)

Much US outer space discourse presents a vision of the human colonization of outer space as both natural and essential to humanity, a ‘psychological and cultural requirement’ that is not merely a ‘Western predisposition’, but ‘a human one’ (Crawford 2005: 260). Regulating such discourse, however, is the normative assumption that space is a ‘masculine’ environment, a territory best suited to the performance of colonial conquest, and an arena for warfare and the display of military and technological prowess. Herein, ‘man’, not woman, is the human model by which to gauge those adventurous enough to engage in the ‘space medium’ (see, e.g. Casper and Moore 1995). ‘Sex’ is only explicitly articulated in US space discourse to signal the category of ‘woman’, and the physical and psychological constraints that woman’s ‘body’ brings to spaceflight and exploration. NASA, for example, in identifying ‘gender-related’ differences affecting the efficacy and effects of spaceflight and travel, focus exclusively on the physiological differences between men and women (bone density, blood flow, hormonal and metabolic differences, etc.). As Caspar and Moore argue, NASA’s heterosexist framings of these issues highlight sex in space as a social and scientific problem (1995: 313). Female bodies are thus ‘constructed against a backdrop in which male bodies are accepted as the norm, an inscription process shaped by the masculine context of space travel’ (ibid.: 316). By identifying only ‘woman’ with ‘sex’, and the ‘ostensibly sexualized features’ of women’s ‘bodies’ (Butler 1990: 26), a certain, heterosexist, order and identity is effectively instituted in US outer space discourse. Fundamentally, the hierarchies of power, identity and cultural and sexual assumption that infuse outer space politics are no different to those that structure are no different to those that structure terrestrial politics. As Morabito, rather worryingly claims, ‘why expect men on the Moon to behave much better than on Earth?’ (2004: 10). Such a statement, and the belief that the human colonization of outer space is natural, essential to, and even inevitable for, humanity, are founded on a conceptualization of ‘universal’ human society dependent on the kind of ‘modern, knowledge-based economy’ that the US has sought to establish through technological, military and commercial expansion. Although the ‘we’ in much US space discourse is intended universally, it is in effect a highly singular and culturally specific construction of identity, one deeply embedded in the liberal belief that humanity needs ‘a sense of freedom’ and ‘choice’ (Seguin 2005: 981); that it was ‘our’ grandparents who thought exploring the ‘scientific revolution’ sprang from the ‘unusual pragmatic and classless entrepreneurship of US society’ that ‘promoted commercialization and innovative marketing of new technology’ (ibid.). ‘Something about space travel excites the human imagination in ways that transcend mundane political objectives’ (Mendell 2005: 7). Contrary to this, and however apparently exciting outer space is envisioned (as an essentially little known and unexplored frontier of human endeavour), there is actually very little about US outer space discourse that suggests humanity has transcended the gendered politics of planet Earth. To understand the reproduction of heterosexualized gender identities as a factor in US policy-making, demands, as Dean suggests, not only a ‘shift of emphasis toward the construction of particular kinds of elite masculinities’, but also ‘consideration of the historical milieu that produced such men’ (Dean 2001: 4). George W. Bush has, frequently throughout his speeches, harked back to bygone eras of masculine fortitude, resilience and vigour by, for example, invoking the crusader zeal of the Christian Knights (2001) or the ‘prevailing resolve’ of those Americans who ‘did not waver in freedom’s cause’ at Pearl Harbor in 1941 (Bush 2005a). In his second term inauguration speech, Bush invokes the Founder Father’s declaration of ‘a new order of the ages’ and the bravery of the soldiers who ‘died in wave upon wave for a union based on ‘freedom’ across the world. He finishes, in a turn of phrase reminiscent of Kennedy’s inaugural address in 1961, to state that America: ‘proclaims liberty throughout all the world, and to all the inhabitants therof. Renewed in our strength – tested, but not weary – we are ready for the greatest achievements in the history of freedom’ (2005b). Similarly, in a 2004 speech to announce a new Space Exploration Program, President Bush calls for the US to continue its ‘quest’ into outer space in the ‘spirit of discovery’ that infused the journeys of the American ‘frontiersmen’ (the ‘daring’, ‘disciplined’, ‘ingenious’, ‘risk-taking’ pioneers that Bush believes astronauts to be) who led their way into the western ‘wilderness’ of eighteenth-century North America.

#### Space Colonization is Reproductive Futurism – the final frontier requires heteronormative reproduction to save the remaining human species - in this setting, queer sexualities are targeted and excluded

Casper and Moore, 1995. (Monica J Caspar and Lisa Jean Moore, PhDs in Sociology from UC Berkeley. “Inscribing Bodies, Inscribing the Future: Gender, Sex, and Reproduction in Outer Space,” *Sociological Perspectives,* v 38, no 2; spp)

We argue that the emergent controversy over "sex in space" is shaped by intersecting and mutually reinforcing discourses about gender, sex, and reproduction in the contemporary United States. Our argument rests on three core findings. First, gender differences are constructed at multiple “spaces” within this domain; males bodies are equated with masculinity and are accepted as the norm, while female bodies are equated with femininity and are configured as problematic. Women astronauts redefined simultaneously as potential sexual partners for male astronauts and as potential reproducers in the interest of colonization. Second, sexual practices are framed exclusively within the heterosexual paradigm, which leaves few “spaces” for other sexualities. Third, sexuality is explicitly and invariably linked to reproduction, reflecting and reinforcing heterosexist assumptions about sexual behavior. Yet, reproduction in a space environment is potentially damaging to missions because human bodies are physiologically transformed by microgravity and radiation. Thus, as far as NASA is concerned, astronauts should neither copulate nor reproduce; within the heterosexual paradigm, preventing sex in space becomes a strategy for preventing reproduction in space. In short, contemporary accounts of sex and reproduction in space, like StarTrek and its progeny, inscribe human bodies and futures, and in so doing tell us a great deal about who "we" are at present. A key theoretical concept informing our analysis is inscription. What exactly do we mean by "inscribing bodies, inscribing the future” Within cultural studies, for example, inscription is defined as the act of "writing" culture onto bodies and/or subjectivities through a variety of social, cultural, and technical practices. In this process, bodies and subjectivities are seen, read, and produced as texts (Treichler and Cartwright 1992). For example, speculative and science fiction have been important cultural “spaces” where new possibilities and freedoms are imagined. Space is constructed in these accounts as a site at which liberatory practices may (or may not) occur. Often, fictional humans depart a troubled Earth to begin again on another planet, although not without a fair amount of hardship and hard work in their new, intergalactic American Dream. It is precisely this vision of possibility and freedom that draws people to science fiction (Lefanu1989; Kuhn1990; Barr 1993)and also to the seemingly infinite possibilities offered by the space program. Yet, we argue that inscribing the future has a negative and pernicious side, as well. Contemporary discourses and practices negate many types of future freedoms, both on Earth and in space. These inscriptions shape our lives profoundly, while they simultaneously shape what could, might, and should occur in space in an uncertain future. To cite one example, heterosexist framings preclude other sexualities by highlighting sex in space as a social and scientific problem for NASA, which must screen out homosexuality and other "deviant" practices in order to proceed with its agenda of exploration. Thus, we suggest that within these cultural "spaces," some inscriptions are disallowed while others are relentlessly pursued. Inscription, then, is a multifaceted practice imbued with both pleasures and dangers.

### Link Magnifier – Space Affs

#### The culture we bring to space matters – ideology carries over

Deerfield, 2016. (Kat, PhD in Critical and Cultural Theory, Cardiff University UK, “Heavenly Bodies: Gender and Sexuality in Extra-Terrestrial Culture,” Dissertation, <http://orca.cf.ac.uk/93157/> spp)

In Part One of this thesis, I focus on the influence of gender in space culture. The texts I examine in Part One raise questions of gendered spatiality and of women seeking a place in space. As a result, much of the theoretical background I use, especially in Chapters Three and Four, comes from feminist geography and spatial theory. In Part Two, I turn my attention to sexual culture in space, including a discussion of time and of the extra-terrestrial’s relationship with the future. I explore these in part through queer theoretical approaches to time, particularly in Chapters Seven and Eight. Like gender and sexuality, the concepts of space and time are not always easy to disentangle, which Paglen also references in the subtitle of his introduction: ‘Geographies of Time’.7 Still, considering the spatial and temporal elements of extra-terrestrial culture separately has been useful to me in shaping this project, because it has allowed me to tease out some of the complex, contradictory meanings of time and space in the culture of spaceflight. Diverging from Paglen’s quotation, although with all respect to the beauty and depth of his words, I will argue that in many ways the spaces and the time of space culture are not so far removed from their earthbound counterparts. There are many material differences between the extra-terrestrial and the earthly; however, when humans travel into extra- terrestrial spaces, we take much of Earth’s culture with us. In particular, in space as on Earth, discussions of gender and sexuality tend to privilege a male, heterosexual subject. In this way, as I will argue, extra-terrestrial culture is constructed as a masculine, heterosexual culture. Method: This thesis comprises close textual analysis of artefacts drawn from what I broadly refer to as ‘extra-terrestrial culture’ or ‘space culture’. I use these terms to mean the cultural reality that exists within and around the field of spaceflight. I contend that spaceflight has a cultural presence beyond the aerospace sciences, beyond government space programmes, and beyond actual astronauts themselves. Space culture is a significant aspect of contemporary culture more broadly, and it is ultimately for this reason that I have pursued this project.

## Realism

### Realism Link – Protection Racket

#### Realism replicates a protector/protected relationship that sustains authoritarian state practices, masks protector violence, and justifies intervention by some to protect others from other others.

Claire Duncanson & Catherine Eschle (2008), University of Edinburgh and University of Strathclyde, “Gender and the Nuclear Weapons State: A Feminist Critique of the UK Government's White Paper on Trident , New Political Science, 30:4, 545-563, DOI: 10.1080/07393140802518120

Feminists in IR problematize the Realist approach to security on several grounds. Most obviously, they question why military threats from other states (or, more recently, from terrorist groups) are considered more important and immediate than the threat to human life posed by poverty, HIV/AIDS, environmental destruction or domestic abuse, all of which are claimed to disproportionately affect women. As a corollary, they challenge the Realist reliance on destructive military technology, insisting that welfare budgets do more to provide genuine security for women than increased defence spending.46 Feminists also seek to undermine the view that security is something which can be possessed or guaranteed by the state. Instead, they have urged us to understand security as a process, immanent in our relationships with others, and always partial, elusive, and contested. Conceived in this way, it must involve subjects—including women—in the provision of their own security.47 Two gendered aspects of Realist conceptions of security are particularly important for our purposes. First, Realists correlate security with invulnerability, invincibility and impregnability. This is strongly evident in the White Paper. It is claimed, for example, that: The rationale for continuous deterrent patrolling (which the UK has maintained since 1969) . . . is that the submarine on patrol is invulnerable to an attack. For example, we are confident that our SSBNs [Ballistic Missile Submarines] on deterrent patrol have remained completely undetected by a hostile or potentially hostile state. This means we have an assured nuclear deterrent available at all times.48 As Susannah Radstone has argued, however, invulnerability is an unachievable fantasy with obviously gendered connotations. It is the female body that is penetrated and impregnated while the male body remains, or ought to remain, intact and impermeable.49 Moreover, as argued above, nuclear technologies do not operate in a social vacuum. They are created and operated by humans and, as such, there can be no guarantees of infallibility. Indeed, the world may be decidedly less secure when submarines armed with nuclear missiles are continuously on patrol, but the emphasis in the White Paper on protection through superior technology makes this possibility unthinkable. Second, and perhaps more important, Realist views of security cast the state and its military wing as “protector” and civilians within the state as “protected,” a dichotomy which is profoundly gendered. Judith Hicks Stiehm, for instance, highlights the historical association of the protector role with men and the protected role with women; further, she claims that the protector role gains meaning and status precisely through its privileging over those who are feminised as vulnerable.50 As Iris Marion Young put it more recently: The role of the masculine protector puts those protected, paradigmatically women and children, in a subordinate position of dependence and obedience. To the extent that citizens of a democratic state allow their leaders to adopt a stance of protectors toward them, these citizens come to occupy a subordinate status like that of women in the patriarchal household. We are to accept a more authoritarian and paternalistic state power, which gets its support partly from the unity a threat produces and our gratitude for protection.51 Although recent years have seen the increasing integration of women into the armed forces in many developed states, the resistance to this process and the anomalies to which it gives rise demonstrate for many feminists that this gendering of roles around protection still runs deep.52 Furthermore, the gendered protector/protected dichotomy still works in symbolic terms. Thus discourses of state protection remain saturated with constructions of “masculine autonomy (freedom, control, heroics) and feminine dependency (passivity, vulnerability, woman as adored but also despised).”53 Moreover, feminists and others have pointed out that security discourse involves an enforced linkage between the protector and protected in the face of an external threat. For Stiehm this functions to mask the fact that the biggest danger to the protected may actually not come from outside the state but from the hyper- masculinised protectors themselves.54 More recent post-structuralist-influenced work has made this relationship between the state and an external threat in Realist thought, or between state identity and “the Other,” central to their analyses. Although “the Other” may seem radically different from “us,” for post- structuralists, it is our understanding of the Other which in part constitutes the self.55 As feminists then point out, the self – other dichotomy frequently has gendered, as well as sexualised and racialised, dimensions. That the Other is frequently feminised, serving to underpin a masculine or hyper-masculine response, can be seen in examples ranging from colonial conceptions of virgin territories populated by compliant, exotic populations, to the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib.56 Alternatively, “the Other” may be portrayed as having a deficient, gross masculinity in contrast to the rationality and restraint of “ourselves.”57 Thus different kinds of masculinities may be mobilised in security discourses, serving to differentiate a particular state government in the eyes of its population from its enemies and to legitimate its protector role.

### Link – “Realism Inevitable”

#### Realism and militarism are not inevitable, they are choices

**Ahmed 12** (Nafeez Mosaddeq, received an M.A. in contemporary war & peace studies and a DPhil in international relations from the School of Global Studies at Sussex University, where he taught for a period in the Department of International Relations, also a journalist at The Guardian. “The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society” p. 343-345 [https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14781158.2011.601854](https://sci-hub.tw/https:/www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14781158.2011.601854))NFleming

Unfortunately, orthodox IR approaches are ill-equipped to understand the complexity of these interconnected global crises and their interdependent impacts on the international system. Generally, IR scholars have examined global crises as discrete phenomena. Economic and financial crises are studied within the discipline of International Political Economy, particularly with a view to understanding their structural causes and trajectories, sometimes including their impact on development, inequality and poverty. Energy depletion as a global systemic problem is rarely acknowledged in the IR literature, but when (rarely) acknowledged, it is largely viewed through the lens of energy policy as an arm of ‘national security’. Similarly, climate change is examined in the context of its strategic implications in exacerbating vulnerability to violent conflict or scrutinised in the context of the scope for inter-state negotiations and global governance.54 For the most part, IR as a discipline has not fully acknowledged the real-world scale of these crises as inherently interdependent phenomena requiring an integrated and holistic theoretical appraisal. Many traditional neorealist scholars, of course, view environmental factors as of either minimal or negligible significance in identifying future security threats and explaining past, present or potential inter-state conflicts.55 Yet as evidence of climate change has become more disturbing, such perspectives have been increasingly contested. While some scholars tend to focus on the role of natural resource shortages or abundance in engendering conditions of anarchy and violence, others investigate the capacity or inability of states to negotiate viable cooperative international regulatory frameworks to prevent or respond to crises. As such, most theorists draw either implicitly or explicitly on neorealist or neoliberal assumptions about state behaviour in the international system, debilitating their ability to understand these crises precisely in their global systemic context. 2.2 Neorealism: tragedy as self-fulfilling prophecy In one salient example, O’Keefe draws extensively on both offensive and defensive variants of neorealist theory, including the work of Jack Snyder, Robert Jervis and Kenneth Waltz, to argue for realism’s continuing relevance in understanding how the ‘biophysical environment plays a significant role in triggering and prolonging the structural conditions that result in conflict’. She notes that standard realist concepts such as ‘anarchy, security dilemmas, and the prisoner’s dilemma’ can be used to explain the emergence of environmental or resource-based violent conflicts largely within, and occasionally between, the weaker states of the South. ‘Environmental anarchy’ occurs in weak states which lack ‘active government regulation’ of the internal distribution of natural resources, leading to a ‘tragedy of the commons’. This generates resource scarcities which lead to ‘security dilemmas’ over ownership of resources, often settled by resort to violence, perpetuated by ‘the prisoner’s dilemma’. 56 Ultimately, this theoretical hypothesis on the causes of environmental or resource-related conflict is incapable of engaging with the deeper intersecting global structural conditions generating resource scarcities, independently of insufficient government management of the internal distribution of resources in weak states. It simplistically applies the Hobbesian assumption that without a centralised ‘Leviathan’ state structure, the persistence of anarchy in itself generates conflict over resources. Under the guise of restoring the significance of the biophysical environment to orthodox IR, this approach in effect actually occludes the environment as a meaningful causal factor, reducing it to a mere epiphenomenon of the dynamics of anarchy in the context of state failure. As a consequence, this approach is theoretically impotent in grasping the systemic acceleration of global ecological, energy and economic crises as a direct consequence of the way in which the inter-state system itself exploits the biophysical environment. The same criticism in fact applies to opposing theories that resource abundance is a major cause of violent conflict. Bannon and Collier, for instance, argue that resource abundance and greed, rather than resource scarcity and political grievances, generated intra-state conflicts financed by the export of commodities in regions like Angola and Sierra Leone (diamonds) or West Africa (tropical timber). In other regions, abundance rather than shortages of oil, drugs and gold fuelled and financed violent secessionist movements in the context of widespread corruption and poor governance.57 Ultimately, this departs little from the theoretical assumptions 55 David G. Victor, ‘What Resource Wars?’, The National Interest 92 (November–December 2007): 49, 52; Stephen M. Walt, ‘Revolution and War’, World Politics 44 (April 1992): 321–68. For an extensive critique of such positions see Mark J. Lacy, Security and Climate Change: International Relations and the Limits of Realism (London: Routledge, 2005). 56 Meghan O’Keefe, ‘The Tragedy of Anarchy: A Realist Appraisal of the Environmental Dimensions of Civil Conflict’, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 11, no. 4 (Spring 2009): 1–2, http://www.jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/ article/view/60/70. 57 Ian Bannon and Paul Collier, Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003), 8–16. 344 N.M. Ahmed Downloaded by [Nanyang Technological University] at 08:38 09 May 2016 above, with weak central state governance still blamed for generating anarchic conditions conducive to conflict over abundant resources. Furthermore, as Kaldor shows, this simplistic perspective overlooks the wider context of the global political economy – the evolution of regional ‘war economies’ was often enabled precisely by the devastating impact of neoliberal structural adjustment programmes, which eroded state structures and generated social crises that radicalised identity politics.58 Under traditional neorealist logic, a strategic response to global environmental crises must involve the expansion of state-military capabilities in order to strengthen the centralised governance structures whose task is to regulate the international distribution of natural resources, as well as to ensure that a particular state’s own resource requirements are protected. Neorealism understands inter-state competition, rivalry and warfare as inevitable functions of states’ uncertainty about their own survival, arising from the anarchic structure of the international system. Gains for one state are losses for another, and each state’s attempt to maximise its power relative to all other states is simply a reflection of its rational pursuit of its own security. The upshot is the normalisation of political violence in the international system, including practices such as over-exploitation of energy and the environment, as a ‘rational’ strategy – even though this ultimately amplifies global systemic insecurity. Inability to cooperate internationally and for mutual benefit is viewed as an inevitable outcome of the simple, axiomatic existence of multiple states. The problem is that neorealism cannot explain in the first place the complex interdependence and escalation of global crises. Unable to situate these crises in the context of an international system that is not simply a set of states, but a transnational global structure based on a specific exploitative relationship with the biophysical environment, neorealism can only theorise global crises as ‘new issue areas’ appended to already existing security agendas.59 Yet by the very act of projecting global crises as security threats, neorealism renders itself powerless to prevent or mitigate them by theorising their root structural causes. In effect, despite its emphasis on the reasons why states seek security, neorealism’s approach to issues like climate change actually guarantees greater insecurity by promoting policies which frame these ‘non-traditional’ issues purely as amplifiers of quite traditional threats. As Susanne Peters argues, the neorealist approach renders the militarisation of foreign and domestic policy a pragmatic and necessary response to issues such as resource scarcities – yet, in doing so, it entails the inevitable escalation of ‘resource wars’ in the name of energy security. Practically, this serves not to increase security for competing state and non-state actors, but to debilitate international security through the proliferation of violent conflict to access and control diminishing resources in the context of unpredictable complex emergencies.60 Neorealism thus negates its own theoretical utility and normative value. For if ‘security’ is the fundamental driver of state foreign policies, then why are states chronically incapable of effectively ameliorating the global systemic amplifiers of ‘insecurity’, despite the obvious rationale to do so in the name of warding off collective destruction, if not planetary annihilation?61

# Impact

### Impact Ext. – Gendered Hierarchies

#### **Hegemonic Masculinity locks in the gender binary, essentialism, and hierarchies that make militarism and gendered violence inevitable**

Sjoberg and Via 2010 Gender, War, and Militarism: Feminist Perspectives By Laura Sjoberg, Sandra Via. <https://books.google.com/books?id=om3yy1JoS34C&printsec=frontcover&dq=Gender,+War,+and+Militarism:+Feminist+Perspectives:+Feminist+Perspectives&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiltpftm8HjAhWGXc0KHYOLAwMQ6AEIKjAA#v=onepage&q=Gender%2C%20War%2C%20and%20Militarism%3A%20Feminist%20Perspectives%3A%20Feminist%20Perspectives&f=false>. Laura Sjoberg is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida. Her research addresses issues of gender and security, with foci on politically violent women, feminist war theorizing, sexuality in global politics, and political methodology. Sandra E. Via Assistant Professor of Political Science. B.A., Ferrum College M.A., Virginia Tech Ph.D., Virginia Tech. ADW

MILITARISM AND HEGEMONIC MASCULINITY Feminists have identified the realm of international security as being dominated by masculine values and norms (Tickner 2001; Sjoberg 2009). Particularly, in the international security realm, values associated with masculinities (e.g., strength, rationality, autonomy) are prized over values associated with femininities (weakness, emotion, interdependence) (Tickner 1992). Within this dichotomy, there is a power hierarchy between different masculinities and different femininities such that an ideal-typical masculinity sits on top of a gendered hierarchy of traits in the international arena (Connell 1995; Hooper 2001). Feminist scholars have identified this ideal-typical masculinity as "hegemonic masculinity" (Connell 1995). Hegemonic masculinity refers to certain masculine norms and values that have become dominant in specific institutions of social control and remain in those institutions to maintain patriarchal social and political orders (Kronsell 2005, 281; Tickner 1992, 6). The dominance of hegemonic masculinity in international security is related to but not reliant on the overrepresentation of men in positions of political and defense leadership (Pettman 1996). Masculinities are prized in political and military leadership, even when that leadership is performed by women. The dominance of hegemonic masculinity relies on its opposition to and competition with subordinated masculinities and femininities. Hegemonic masculinities at once promote a particular organization of the political order and reinforce unequal relationships between men and women in order to promote the legitimation of masculine authority (Tickner 1992, 6). Charlotte Hooper explains, "as masculinity is the valued term, it can be argued that femininity is merely a residual category, a foil or Other for masculinity to define itself against" (Hooper 2001, 43). Values associated with masculinity are prized only insomuch as they are superior to values associated with femininity (Hooper 2001, 43). A man's (or anyone's) claim to masculinity, therefore, is a positional claim in opposition to a feminine other that society has constructed to be the lesser of the two binaries. Without the existence of an individual or group that can be labeled as the weaker party, masculine social norms would be without content. Masculine social norms in international politics are particularly evident in militarized institutions, which are structured around gendered, hierarchical relationships both within the institutions and in their accomplishment of their missions (Tickner 1992). The term "militarization" is used to denote when "militaristic values (e.g., a belief in hierarchy, obedience, and the use of force)" are adopted by states, organizations, individuals, corporations, and so on (Enloe 2007, 4). Feminists have associated militarism, masculinity, and wartime hero narratives, arguing that militaristic behavior is a path by which men and masculine states can prove their masculinity (Huston 1983, 271; Sjoberg 2006b). Idealized masculinities for soldiers throughout history have included characteristics associated with aggression, bravery, courage, service, precision, and protection (Hooper 2001, 81). Idealized militarized masculinities are social, but they are also physical, where militarics emphasize the soldiers' physical strength, particularly upper body strength, by means of training exercises and certain areas of specialization within militaries (i.e., the Navy SEALS, Army Rangers). Many militaristic cultures emphasize the physical and social traits of a soldier in opposition to femininity. These accounts emphasize the importance of physical and upper body strength, framing soldiering in opposition to women's "natural" lack of upper body strength and other physical capabilities (Miller 1998). If "men" are physically capable of soldiering and physical incapacity to soldier is feminized, then both the "sex" (male / female) and "gender" (masculine/ feminine) compositions of militaries are overdetermined. Other characteristics associated with masculinity and valued by the process of militarization (such as stoicism and rationality) also masculinize militarism. Ultimately, soldiering is related to and inseparable from masculinity, where masculinity is proved by soldiering, which is reliant on preexisting (assumed) masculinity. The conceptual and actual interdependence of masculinity and soldiering does not mean women are excluded from the practice or profession of soldiering. As feminists have noted, women are increasingly both professional and recruited soldiers (Enloe 2004; Sasson-Levy 2003). Still, women do not enter militaries that are suddenly degendered or gender- neutral because of their presence (Enloe 2000; Sjoberg 2007). Instead, like their male counterparts, many women soldiers are being asked to prove their masculinity in terms of physical prowess and military-favored social characteristics (Cohn 2000). At the same time, military recruiting ads that feature women show a double standard, where women are required to exhibit the capabilities and traits associated with masculinity while maintaining feminine appearance (including high heels, makeup, and jewelry) (Brown 2006). As several female soldiers have described, they are expected to emulate (and even exceed) masculine gender characteristics, and challenged not to show any of the perceived weaknesses associated with femininity, all while walking a gender-role tightrope where they do not deconstruct the gender dichotomies on which sociopolitical relation- ships are founded. Many militaries remain gendered not only in the personality characteristics they select for but also in the experiences of women who are a part of those organizations. Many military organizations exclude women from combat roles (Komblum 1984; l-lorrigan 1992). Many militaries have high levels of sexual violence perpetrated by male soldiers against female soldiers and other implicit and explicit sexually discriminatory policies (Morris 1996). Other military organizations construct soldiering in opposition to militarized feminized roles, such as military wives (Enloe 1990; Horn, chapter 4, this volume) and civilians (Elshtain 1987; Kinsella 2005; Sjoberg 2006a). The role of military wife involves a willingness to relocate quickly and frequently, self-sufficiency to raise children and take care of the home when the soldier is sent on a tour of duty, support for male troops and other military wives, and service as motivation for the soldier to fight well and return home safely. In these militarized feminine roles, women must act and perform as (stereotypical) women (Enloe 1990). Cynthia Enloe documents the extent to which women, "acting as women," are essential to the success of a military. A large part of the gendered roles in and around militarization can be accounted for by understanding the centrality of hero narratives to both soldiering and Citizenship. In these narratives, the heroic warrior defends the feminized other for the good of self, family, and country (Huston 1983; Elshtain 1987; Young 2003). In this social structure, men are not only honored as citizen-warriors but are also bound to fight when called upon (Goldstein 2001), while women serve as biological and social reproducers of the nation generally and soldiers specifically (Yuval-Davis 1987).

# Alternative

### Alt solves the K

#### And, our knowledge production is disruptive - exposes and opposes the hegemonic masculinity of dominant IR theory

Marks, 2011 (Michael Marks, Professor of Politics at Willamette University, PhD in Government from Cornell, *Metaphors in International Relations Theory*, 2011, pp. 3-8; spp)

It is increasingly apparent that what is known about international relations is not so much a universally shared agreement about objective realities but rather a reflection of dominant ways of knowing that frame issues and debates not to mention the empirical bases of international affairs. The constructivist paradigm is probably the most prominent and most explicit school of thought in its acknowledgement that the empirical bases of world affairs can be conceptualized theoretically such that different visions of reality can be constructed. However, it is not the only approach in the study of international relations that advances claims about the discursive framing by which the facts of international relations are conceived. As Jim George (1994) asserts, all of the major theoretical perspectives in IR advance a discursive project that sets out what is conceivable in the study of international relations. Metaphors are just one set of discursive tools with which the factual bases of international relations can be represented in the theories that are used to conceptualize world affairs. As John Agnew (2007, 138) observes, knowledge about any subject (but for Agnew’s purpose as well as ours, knowledge about international relations) can be defined as “explanatory schemes, frames of reference, crucial sets of assumptions, narrative traditions, and theories.” Agnew (ibid.) further states that “a great deal of interpretive projection is the result of the imposition of intellectual/political hegemonies from some places onto others.” Thus, whether they are metaphors or any of the other means for constructing knowledge available to scholars, what is known at any given time or in any given place about international relations is reflective of how knowledge about a subject is formulated. One of the main theses of this book is that metaphors in international relations theory do far more than simply supply evocative imagery to explanatory frameworks. Instead, a major contention of this study is that the generally accepted paradigms that are used to analyze international relations are built on metaphorical imagery that provides the very theoretical propositions these paradigms use to hypothesize and make predictions about international affairs. It is now generally agreed that metaphors play an integral role in human cognition. Most, if not all, human thought is metaphorical in the sense that humans use metaphors to recognize patterns and relationships among concrete and conceptual categories. Language reflects the inclination of humans to use metaphors in understanding the world, and thus both everyday language and the vocabulary of theoretical reasoning alike are built on the metaphorical images that people use to recognize similarities and differences in what they encounter in both the old and the new. Metaphors in theory of any sort can be casual, for example, the image of a metaphorical “big bang” that physicists employ to visualize the origins of the “universe” (itself, a metaphor), or integral, for example, the metaphor of economic “cycle” on which entire schools of thought are devoted in the field of economics. In international relations theory, the ontological assumptions and epistemological methods of the various paradigmatic approaches are suffused with metaphors. For example, Vincent Pouliot (2007, 362) observes that the structure-functionalist approach to the study of international relations is distinguished by its “talk of systems, equilibriums, and structures,” each of which is a metaphorical image that constructs what is knowable using this approach. By the same token, Pouliot (362) points out that the contending Constructivist approach “has its own dialect full of social constructions, norms, and identities,” which are also metaphorical in nature Some of these metaphors are obvious, while others, due to either their repeated use or mundane quality, go largely unnoticed and undetected by scholars in the field. Metaphors in IR theory used deliberately to generate hypotheses can eventually become reified to the extent that they lose their heuristic nature, while metaphors used casually often are not investigated with regard to their validity for giving insight into the subject matter at hand. Throughout the course of this book readers will discover that the vast majority of the terms cataloguing, defining, and naming theories, concepts, and analytical tools pertaining to the study of international relations are metaphorical in nature. The reader may then be prompted to ask, if that is the case, what is not a metaphor in international relations theory and, if the answer is very little to nothing, what is the point of highlighting what could then be thought of as unavoidable elements in the scholarly discipline at hand? As the next chapter will explain, it is a fact that no realm of human cognition is devoid of metaphorical imagery, including every academic discipline. It is because of this that the choice, conscious or not, of metaphors that aid in any theoretical process has consequences for what empirical topics are studied, what assumptions underlie these inquiries, and what theoretical propositions are put to the test. Since no sustained attention has been paid to this endeavor in the past, it is helpful to undertake an examination of metaphors in IR theory to see what impact they have on the field. To give the reader a sense of how metaphors operate in international relations theory it is useful to start with an example that demonstrates the ubiquity of metaphor in IR though. International relations are said to be governed by certain “structures.” “Structure” is a term that typically implies physical qualities. Thus, initially, “structure” was simply a way to suggest certain metaphorical physical constraints on states and other international actors. Today, however, it is used literally as a descriptor for that which defines world affairs. Continual use of metaphorical term in any context tends to give what once was a metaphor the appearance of being literally true. Regardless of the intentions of scholars, and leaving entirely aside the question of whether or not there is an objective reality that people agree on, as long as individuals have a choice in what language to use to describe something, the language that eventually is chosen is both inevitably metaphorical and influences the way concepts in international relations theory are framed. WHY METAPHORS MATTER Many of the metaphors that have been devised by scholars to frame the study of international relations are self-consciously seen as contrivances that help observers make inferences about how international relations works. For example, in introductory international relations classes, college students are frequently taught to think of the world metaphorically as a “billiard table” with states imagined as metaphorical “balls.” These billiards images ostensibly introduce students to the basic elements of traditional international relations theory. States are thought of metaphorically as “hard-shelled and impenetrable territorially sovereign states” (Opello and Rosow 19999, 226), and are said to have “interests [tat] are defined exogenously” in a “process [that] is characterized by intergovernmental bargaining and unlimited state interest” (Sjursen 2001, n.p.). In the billiard ball model there are no “good” states or “bad” states (Mearsheimer 1994-1995, 48), and “[o]nly the hard exteriors touch, and heavier or faster moving ones push others out of the way” (Burton 1972,28). There are other metaphorical contrivances for the milieu of international relations as well. For example, the “billiard ball” metaphor can be compared to the similar-sounding, albeit theoretically opposed, “’egg-box’ conception of international society,” whereby “the sovereign states are the eggs, the box is the international society and the purpose of the box is to ‘separate and cushion, not to act’” (Wheeler 1996, 126). The “web” or “cobweb” model challenges the billiard ball image of states as hard-shelled actors by promoting the vision of an international society in which relations among a variety of global action resemble the intertwined threads of a web-like matrix (Burton 1972, 35-45). Sometimes it seems as if the billiard ball image of international relations is the target for every other metaphor that challenges the theoretical implications of the billiard ball model. In their 2006 article – “Billiard Balls or Snowflakes?” – for example, Benjamin Fordham and Victor Asal (2007, 48) suggest that major powers be seen less as hard shelled impenetrable objects and more like metaphorical “snowflakes” “with many potentially relevant internal characteristics.” Other metaphors include the “burning house” vision of the international system and the “forest” image of an international system comprising homogenous states pictured metaphorically as “trees.” In recent years scholars have become rather creative in contriving metaphors to capture what they see as the nature of the milieu that constitutes the world of international relations. Robert Kaplan (1994, 75), for example, suggests the metaphor of a “hologram” to describe what he sees as the multifaceted nature of international relations. Examining the role of metaphors that frame the context of international relations is not a purely academic exercise. There are real-world implications for foreign policymaking of these metaphors as well. During her keynote address at the Citizen Diplomacy Summit in 2005, former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright made the following metaphorical observation that reflected her view of foreign policy: As you may have seen, there are also many other surveys showing that international support for US foreign policy is at the lowest level since the Vietnam War. The main complaint is that we don’t take the interests of other countries into account and that we are too quick to use military force. How do we explain these perceptions? What can we do to change them? I thought about this and then decided that it helps to compare foreign policy to a game of pool. Everybody always talks about foreign policy as a game of chess, but that doesn’t work for me because chess is a very deliberate and slow game where you take a lot of time to make decisions. I’ve always thought that a pool table makes more sense because when one ball is hit it smacks into others and each of them caroms around and hits some more, just like our policy makers that start out in one direction, but end up going in six. Everything that happens has an effect on everything else, all of which leads us to a lot of unintended consequences. In this case it’s the invasion of Iraq that has rearranged the balls on the table… The worst days in fact may well lie ahead – but we can help the situation overall by going back to that pool table and starting some balls moving in a different direction. (Albright 2005a, 23 emphasis added) The Realist metaphorical imagery of these statements is unmistakable and could be recognized by any first-year student in a college introductory international relations class. Albright was speaking not as an academic but as a former senior policymaker in the U.S. foreign policy establishment. However, she was speaking not as a politician trying to frame an issue or gain popular support, but rather as a policymaker schooled in the theories of international relations. Madeleine Albright was one of the major architects of U.S. foreign policy during the administration of President Bill Clinton. Scholars can argue about the motivations of Albright and others in the U.S. foreign policy establishment at that time, but what emerges from the former Secretary of State’s 2005 observations is that her own thinking about the world has been shaped by the theoretical conclusions that follow from the billiard ball metaphor so closely associated with realist theory. One can presume that Secretary Albright had given a good deal of thought to the way she imagines the nature of international relations and that her pool table reference was not just an off-the-cuff remark. Rather, we can reasonably infer that the action taken by the Clinton administration were a direct reflection of the theoretical lens Madeleine Albright carried with her as Secretary of State. Armed with clues found in Albright’s billiard ball comments, scholars who had puzzled over the motivations of the framers of U.S. foreign policy during the Clinton administration now have a better ability to understand the theoretical roots of this policy. The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that metaphors that frame the context of international relations are not solely part of a purely theoretical endeavor. What constitutes the field of inquiry that falls under the rubric of international relations depends on what metaphorical perspectives shape the field. In light of this observation, this book adopts a critical perspective in analyzing the central metaphors in international relations. The term “critical” often is associated with approaches in international relations that reveal relationships of power among international actors that are concealed by traditional theoretical perspectives. This book takes a different posture, directing its attention not at international actors but at theories of international relations themselves. While it is true that many critical IR scholars have as their immediate target what they see as deficiencies in existing theoretical frameworks, for many of them the ultimate aim is to direct attention at how international affairs are constructed in ways that are not revealed by traditional theoretical approaches. In this book I am less critical of the subject matter of international relations inquiry than I am of the nature of international relations theory used to study it. I neither know nor suspect that there is something about international relations that is not revealed to IR scholars via traditional theoretical perspectives, including critical ones. Rather, I assume that how international relations is revealed reflects scholars’ own conceptual impressions that they experience through metaphors and convey to others through metaphorical expression. My purpose in this book is to critically examine metaphorical expression in international relations to see what that reveals about the theoretical propositions that characterize diverse scholarly traditions.

### AT: Perm

#### **Mutually exclusive – the aff mobilizes the nation state towards battle – our alt tries to zap that militaristic energy**

D’Costa, 2021 (Bina D'Costa is a Professor at the Department of International Relations, Coral Bell School of Asia-Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University. At the height of Europe’s refugee emergency, she moved to the UNICEF Office of Research-Innocenti to build its Migration and Displacement program (2016-2018). As a UN staff member, Bina has worked in South and Southeast Asia, Eastern and Southern Africa, and the Middle East. “Learning/unlearning in International Relations through the politics of margins and silence,”Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2021, Vol. 75, No. 6, 591-603; accessed through lib.umich.edu – Taylor and Francis Database; spp)

Feminist scholars observed that nationalist movements have extensively used gendered imagery that appeals to masculine heroes to defend their motherland (Elshtain 1987; Enloe 1990; Tickner 1994; Pettman 1996). Ann Tickner wrote, ‘Our identity as citizens depends on telling stories about and celebrating wars of independence or national liberation and other great victories in battle’ (Tickner 1994, 33). In Tickner’s articulation, national anthems are frequently war songs, just as holidays are celebrated with military parades and uniforms that recall great feats in past conflicts. Telling stories is central to the creation of this sort of identity where a common heroic past provides a symbolic meaning that supersedes all other memories in order to evoke loyalty only to the nation-state (Tickner 1994).2 Inspired by Pettman and Tickner’s framing, I turned my gaze to gendered violence in South Asia’s nationbuilding stories. I analysed 1947 Partition of India and 1971 War of Bangladesh through a gender justice lens. In my comparative analysis, I argued how pain, sadness and humiliation have a symbolic place in the formation of a heroic past. Past/present pain and humiliation are used to mobilise the nation, with individual pain being appropriated for the community’s political purposes. The experiences of marginalised group of people (for example, women, minorities, and young people) are either appropriated or completely erased in this dominant story. Neither their participation in national movements nor their suffering in wars has been recorded with a gender-sensitive tone; on the contrary, both have been subsumed in the construction of the official histories of their countries. Women, particularly those, who were subjected to rape and sexual violence, were marginalised, restricted and their bodies regulated for the nationbuilding project. Struggles over history, not only about how and what to remember, but also how and what to forget, have been manifested in official narratives of the nation-state. Women’s stories have been excluded from textbooks, and careful state propaganda about national wars and history is used to reconstruct memory. A pronounced departure from previous scholarship in feminist IR for me had been to describe nationbuilding processes as spontaneous and local community-driven, and distinct from statebuilding initiatives supported by the international community. I was more invested in learning about gender justice. The experiences of feminist scholars in IR have been one of persistent struggles not only in terms of exploring the role of gender in global politics but also in probing the ‘so what’ question. The exclusionary approaches by traditional IR contribute to the conceptualisation of ‘East and West’ that simultaneously tells the story of ‘who we are’ and ‘who is not us’. While a number of critical IR scholars are attentive to this bias, the gendered political discourse marginalises minorities, particularly women (but also colonised and therefore, feminised men) for a second time. Critical feminist scholars from Asia and the Pacific wrote about marginality of poverty-stricken communities, refugees, internally displaced populations, and religious and ethnic minorities (for a discussion, see D’Costa 2006). These groups are marginal because of their location on the boundaries of marginalised states, and are often silenced because of power inequality. The dual marginalisation of women (as members of marginalised communities and as members of the disadvantaged gender) makes the struggle for emancipatory and empowered ‘feminist futures’ even more complex. While critical feminist international relations expose women’s experiences of violence in conflicts, it may not always offer a framework of redress for victims and survivors. Crossing over to critical feminist international law we are better able to grasp how gender sensitive and gender responsive trial processes could provide women with some healing and some sense of justice.

### Sequencing – Alt First

#### **Epistemological and ontological revisionism essential to disrupting toxic masculinity in IR – the alternative must come before we can act in the political sphere**

Youngs 04 (Gillian, Professor of Digital Economy at the University of Brighton, Feminist International Relations: a contradiction in terms? Or: why women and gender are essential to understanding the world ‘we’ live in\*, International Affairs, 80, pgs 77-80, JKS)

This discussion will demonstrate, in the ways outlined above, the depth and range of feminist perspectives on power—a prime concern of International Relations and indeed of the whole study of politics. It will illustrate the varied ways in which scholars using these perspectives study power in relation to gender, a nexus largely disregarded in mainstream approaches. From feminist positions, this lacuna marks out mainstream analyses as trapped in a narrow and superficial ontological and epistemological framework. A major part of the problem is the way in which the mainstream takes the appearance of a pre- dominantly male-constructed reality as a given, and thus as the beginning and end of investigation and knowledge-building. Feminism requires an ontological revisionism: a recognition that it is necessary to go behind the appearance and examine how differentiated and gendered power constructs the social relations that form that reality. ¶ While it may be empirically accurate to observe that historically and contemporaneously men have dominated the realms of international politics and ¶ economics, feminists argue that a full understanding of the nature of those realms must include understanding the intricate patterns of (gendered) inequalities that shape them. Mainstream International Relations, in accepting that because these realms appear to be predominantly man-made, there is no reason to ask how or why that is the case, stop short of taking account of gender. As long as those who adhere to this position continue to accept the sufficiency of the appearances and probe no further, then the ontological and epistemological limitations will continue to be reproduced. ¶ Early work in feminist International Relations in the 1980s had to address this problem directly by peeling back the masculinist surface of world politics to reveal its more complex gendered (and racialized) dynamics. Key scholars such as Cynthia Enloe focused on core International Relations issues of war, militarism and security, highlighting the dependence of these concepts on gender structures—e.g. dominant forms of the masculine (warrior) subject as protector/conqueror/exploiter of the feminine/feminized object/other—and thus the fundamental importance of subjecting them to gender analysis. In a series of works, including the early Bananas, beaches and bases: making feminist sense of international politics (1989), Enloe has addressed different aspects of the most overtly masculine realms of international relations, conflict and defence, to reveal their deeper gendered realities.3 This body of work has launched a powerful critique of the taboo that made women and gender most invisible, in theory and practice, where masculinity had its most extreme, defining (and violent) expression. Enloe’s research has provided one of the most comprehensive bodies of evidence for the ontological revisionism required of mainstream International Relations, especially in relation to its core concerns. ¶ When Enloe claimed that ‘gender makes the world go round’,4 she was in fact turning the abstract logic of malestream International Relations inside out. This abstract logic saw little need to take theoretical and analytical account of gender as a social force because in practical terms only one gender, the male, appeared to define International Relations. Ann Tickner has recently offered the reminder that this situation persists: ‘During the 1990s, women were admitted to most combat positions in the U.S. military, and the U.S. president appointed ¶ the first female secretary of state, but occupations in foreign and military policy- making in most states remain overwhelmingly male, and usually elite male.’5 ¶ Nearly a decade earlier, in her groundbreaking work Gender in International Relations: feminist perspectives on achieving global security,6 she had asked the kinds of questions that were foundational to early feminist International Relations: ‘Why is the subject matter of my discipline so distant from women’s lived experiences? Why have women been conspicuous only by their absence in the worlds of diplomacy and military and foreign policy-making?’ Tickner, like Enloe, has interrogated core issues in mainstream International Relations, such as security and peace, providing feminist bases for gendered understanding of issues that have defined it. Her reflection on what has happened since Gender in International Relations was published indicates the prominence of tensions between theory and practice. ‘We may have provided some answers to my questions as to why IR and foreign policymaking remain male-dominated; but breaking down the unequal gender hierarchies that perpetuate these androcentric biases remains a challenge.’7 ¶ The persistence of the overriding maleness of international relations in practice is part of the reason for the continued resistance and lack of responsiveness to the analytical relevance feminist International Relations claims. In other words, it is to some extent not surprising that feminist International Relations stands largely outside mainstream International Relations, because the concerns of the former, gender and women, continue to appear to be subsidiary to high politics and diplomacy. One has only to recall the limited attention to gender and women in the recent Afghanistan and Iraq crises to illustrate this point.8 So how have feminists tackled this problem? Necessarily, but problematically, by calling for a deeper level of ontological revisionism. I say problematically because, bearing in mind the limited success of the first kind discussed above, it can be anticipated that this deeper kind is likely to be even more challeng- ing for those in the mainstream camp. ¶ The second level of ontological revisionism required relates to critical understanding of why the appearance of international relations as predominantly a sphere of male influence and action continues to seem unproblematic from mainstream perspectives. This entails investigating masculinity itself: the nature of its subject position—including as reflected in the collective realm of politics— and the frameworks and hierarchies that structure its social relations, not only in relation to women but also in relation to men configured as (feminized) ‘others’ ¶ because of racial, colonial and other factors, including sexuality. Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart directly captured such an approach as ‘the “man” question in international relations’.9 I would like to suggest that for those sceptical about feminist International Relations, Zalewski’s introductory chapter, ‘From the “woman” question to the “man” question in International Relations’, offers an impressively transparent way in to its substantive terrain.10 Reflecting critically on the editors’ learning process in preparing the volume and working with its contributors, both men and women, Zalewski discusses the various modifications through which the title of the work had moved. These included at different stages the terms ‘women’, ‘masculinity’ and ‘feminism’, finally ending with ‘the “man” question’—signalling once again, I suggest, tensions between theory and practice, the difficulty of escaping the concrete dominance of the male subject position in the realm of international relations. ¶ The project’s starting point revealed a faith in the modernist commitment to the political importance of bringing women into the position of subjecthood. We implicitly accepted that women’s subjecthood could be exposed and revealed in the study and practice of international relations, hoping that this would also reveal the nature of male dominance and power. Posing the ‘man’ question instead reflects our diminishing belief that the exclusion of women can be remedied by converting them into subjects.11 ¶ Adding women appeared to have failed to ‘destabilize’ the field; so perhaps critically addressing its prime subject ‘man’ head-on could help to do so. ‘This leads us to ask questions about the roles of masculinity in the conduct of international relations and to question the accepted naturalness of the abundance of men in the theory and practice of international relations’ (emphasis added).12 ¶ The deeper level of ontological revisionism called for by feminist Inter- national Relations in this regard is as follows. Not only does it press beyond the appearance of international relations as a predominantly masculine terrain by including women in its analysis, it goes further to question the predominant masculinity itself and the accepted naturalness of its power and influence in collective (most significantly state) and individual forms.

# Framework

### Epistemology Debating Good

#### Feminist critique of IR is a necessary corrective to the normalizing discourses of government, academia, and debate

Sjoberg 2012 (Laura Sjoberg, PhD in IR from USC and Professor at UF, and Christian Chessman, JD UC Berk, "The Biopower of Occupation: Insights for ‘Knowledge Exchange’in (Gender and) IR,” November 17, 2012 http://genderinglobalgovernancenet-work.net/events/critical-reflections-on-the-researcher-practitioner-relationship-2/attachment/sjoberg-and-chessman-biopower-of-occupation (rishi).

We argue that (American, mainstream) IR can be understood as an imperium that by its constitution excludes feminist work. This IR is a world that polices its boundaries, whatever they are. Each “debate” excludes its other as much as it constructs a conflict between its in-crowd**.** From a feminist perspective, its hard to see feminist work as within those boundaries. In fact, twenty five years after the establishment of a field of feminist IR, and fifteen years after Ann Tickner’s (1997) “You Just Don’t Understand,” there’s a sense that, maybe, the “mainstream” of IR just will never understand. In conversations with colleagues, there is no longer a consensus that trying to “mainstream” feminist IR is a worthwhile project. In fact, the project has become quite controversial. Should “we” talk to/with the 19 mainstream? If so, how? How do we do so while both getting “them” to listen and keep “our” intellectual integrity? Ann Tickner tells us that “the effect [of feminist IR] on the mainstream discipline, particularly in the United States, continues to be marginal**”** (1997, 611). It must be, then, something about the content of feminist IR compared to the content of “mainstream” IR that inhibits exchanges and leads to “awkward silences and miscommunications” (Tickner 1997, 612). Feminist IR and mainstream IR live in and constitute different worlds**.5** Mainstream IR did not know the world of feminist IR – a world of contingency, subjectivity, emancipation, and empathy.As the two approaches got to know each other (and, by relating, themselves) in the late 1980s, it became clear that the place that feminist IR would like to have in IR was incompatible with the ways that mainstream IR saw (and valued) itself and feminism. Mainstream IR would like to compartmentalize feminist IR in the world that it created and has become accustomed to, while feminist IR would like to mainstream gender into IR scholarship, making gender-based analysis a crucial and core part of disciplinary inquiry. Early conversations about feminist IR expressed hope for this sort of relationship on both sides. Robert Keohane proclaimed that “feminist standpoint theory provides a particularly promising starting-point for the development of feminist international relations theory” (1989, 245). Fred Halliday noted that “the international relations can and should adjust to a set of issues that have, to date, received scant attention” (1988, 20 426). From the feminist side, Sandra Whitworth declared that “the next stage of international relations theory will not be one that is merely critical, but one which is critical and feminist” (1989, 270). Ann Tickner set upon a project to “de-gender” International Relations as a field (1992). Much early feminist IR work held the clear understanding that, though IR as a discipline and global politics as a field are deeply gendered, that gendering is correctable and can/will be corrected by feminist scholarship. The mainstream would read feminist scholarship, see the gendering of IR, and pursue their research programs with the knowledge of that gendering. Though women’s position in the field and the world was poor, it could be fixed with the mainstream’s recognition and acceptance. That acceptance**, however,** was not forthcoming, and was piecemeal when it happened. Instead, feminist IR demands to be taken seriously as a world-transforming force and treated with respect and dignity. As Ann Tickner explains, the limitations that the mainstream places on the role of feminist scholarship are “asking feminists to do more of the moving” and “give up epistemological positions which they believe are better suited to uncovering oppressive gender hierarchies” (Tickner 1998, 209). While mainstream IR demands that feminist IR have a static and defined identity that fits into the “condo across town” that it has provided feminist IR, feminist scholarship cannot and will not accept either a narrow and strict definition or a marginal role. As Marysia Zalewski notes, “the suggekstion that feminism is controversially undecidable sits uneasily with unremitting requests to confirm its attendant status. Yet, questions calculated to reify an inhibiting structural position hinge on a certain precision regarding 21 the character of contemporary feminism. Failure to secure this position occasions a tendency to impose it (2003, 291). Because feminist IR cannot and will not accept the space or definition that it has been allocated, feminist IR cannot be kept in its proper place in the predefined world of mainstream IR – it must inhabit a space outside IR rather than as inside it as a constitutive other. Even as feminist theorists try to look and act as if they fit in with the mainstream, as Ann Tickner laments, “feminist theorists have rarely achieved the serious engagement with other IR scholars for which they have frequently called. When they have occurred, conversations have often led to misunderstandings and other kinds of miscommunication” (1997, 628). She attributes these miscommunications of “lack of understanding and judgments” (Tickner 1997, 629). As Marysia Zalewski notes, “it is not uncommon to assume that theorizing about women lacks the depth and strength of other kinds of scholarly analyses, especially those favored by the mainstream” (2003, 292). In other words, some theorizing about women acts as a constitutive other to the mainstream IR orthodoxy. That theorizing appears to be close to feminist theorizing in IR, but it really serves as the constitutive other (inside) the mainstream of the discipline that serves as a condition of the possibility of outside-ness of feminist research. This makes feminist research (one of) IR’s uninhabitable space(s). Seeing IR as this sort of imperium vis a vis feminist theorizing brings up the question of what it would look like to “occupy” IR. What would it look like to physically inhabit the discipline of IR? To be an embodied disruption of the social order which makes inhabitation impossible? To occupy a space of protest? A space of otherness? A 22 space of liminality? What would it look to reside in but remain outside of the possible political space of IR? To use biopower to resist the orthoroxy and operationality of IR? Certainly, the question of the relationship between feminist IR and mainstream IR has been explored in the discipline in a number of ways (e.g., Sjoberg 2009). But the question of the materiality of occupation, we argue, might be a good way to think about feminisms and IR. Several ways of thinking about this might bear fruit. The first is the physical inhabitation of the discipline of IR. This is more complicated than it first appears, given that the discipline of IR is a political economy, where if one is able to be sustainably present, it is because one is in some sense included by/with the discipline as a paid member of a faculty, allowing one the time and resources to both eat and write. At the same time, the intersection of that political economy of being a faculty member and the political economy of knowledge production is not zero-sum, where tokenist inclusion in the political economy of being a faculty member can actually signify the creation of a constitutive other in the political economy of knowledge production. It is when it reaches this point that we argue that feminist IR might usefully benefit from thinking about and acting on occupying the discipline of IR. So far, such a strategy has not (explicitly or implicitly) been a part of how feminisms have dealt with IR. While some look to stand outside of IR (Brown 1988) or actively reconstruct IR without reference to the mainstream of the discipline (Squires and Weldes 2007), still others engage the discipline (Tickner 1992). These strategies, though, might be enhanced by applying some of the unique methods of occupation when we think about how to interact with the discipline. For feminist IR, physically inhabiting the discipline of 23 IR might be accomplished by going to the spaces that IR feels safe in its exclusion of feminisms – conference spaces, panel spaces, journal spaces, book spaces, university spaces – and occupying them – reading, writing, talking, interrupting. It might be accomplished by establishing a physical presence places where feminists and feminist work/ideas are usually not welcome – infiltrating social space to infiltrate intellectual space, coming uninvited, asking feminist questions of non-feminist work, and the like. An embodied disruption of the social order may be that sort of physical presence in unwelcome spaces or disruption of existing physical space – whether by speaking, attire, physical location, or engagement in/with/at the international relations imperium. It might be something as simple as wearing ‘marriage equality’ or ‘this is what a feminist looks like’ tshirts in the place of business suits at conferences, or something as complicated as a large-scale feminist presence intervening in a conference panel that ignores or surpreses gender concerns. Embodied disruptions can be in physical presence itself or in the ways in which physical presences react to, narrative, involve, or implicate a particular critique of the way that IR works. Occupying a space of protest, in “Occupy” movement terms, is to refuse to keep protest confined to the allowed spaces (feminist journals, feminist theory and gender studies panels, allocated chapter space in textbooks and syllabi) and instead to engage in interventionary protests in uninhabitable spaces**.** Spaces of protest can be as straightforward as full Gender/IR textbooks (e.g., Shepherd 2009) and as sideways as presenting a paper different than that announced in an impermissible space for feminisms/feminist research. Occupying a space of otherness requires transcending the 24 confined space of IR’s constitutive other (inclusiveness that allows and produces exclusiveness), to act simultaneously physically present in but conceptually outside of, against, and contrary to the orthodoxy and perfect operationality of IR. Finally, occupying a space of liminality for feminist IR might mean embracing both intellectual instability (there is not one feminist IR but many) and disciplinary instability (feminist IR is not homed in IR). Certainly, feminist IR must (and should) continue to live its life in the absence of the mainstream’s realization of the place that gender analysis should hold in the world of IR. Feminist IR should continue to live its life with its head held high, proud of what we do and how we do it, and careful, as Sarah Brown notes, to maintain our identity in terms of epistemology, ontology, and methodology. Still, a call to move beyond being marginal seems to call for ignoring the very forces that we critique in global politics as they are manifested in our own professional lives. If feminist work in IR pays attention to the gendered power disparities in the social and political arenas, feminists who do that work cannot ignore the gendered power disparities within our own discipline. If we critique the compartmentalization of women in global politics, we need to do so while understanding (not accepting, but understanding) the boundaries our discipline has given our work. In this context, liminality means embracing uncertainty and change, in the world, in the discipline, and in the research of the discipline. It is not marginality or mainstream, engagement or ignoring, occupying or complicity – it is both sides of each of those dichotomies at once. The occupation of liminal space is embracing the by nature unstable identity and practice of feminisms in IR. 25 Would an occupied IR look any different than a non-occupied IR? Perhaps, perhaps not. Would the intellectual relationship between feminist IR and mainstream IR look different for the occupation? Almost certainly. For our purposes now, it is the intellectual relationship that we are interested in – the idea that a feminist occupation of IR makes IR’s uninhabitable space inhabitable – fundamentally changing the borders/boundaries of the discipline and their functioning, in ways similar to the (intellectual) impacts of making the uninhabitable space of the other to the neoliberal imperium inhabitable fundamentally rippled the tenability of the neoliberal imperium. This is all the more true given the “Occupy” understanding of knowledge(/its political relations and interactions) as inherently non-hierarchical, coincident with the feminist/poststructuralist interest in critically reevaluating/deconstructing hierarchies in IR knowledges. Occupying Research All of that said, limiting the methodology of occupation to understanding disciplinary politics seems both unnecessarily limiting and a waste. The real questions that we are interested in asking are about what it would mean to use “Occupy” as a research method for IR, particularly in correspondence with feminist ontologies and epistemologies in the discipline. Thinking of what it might mean to “occupy” as a method of research requires a brief discussion of feminist research methods. Ann Tickner suggests four perspectives which guide much of the methodology of feminist research: “a deep concern with which research questions get asked and why; the goal of designing research that is 26 useful for women; a preoccupation with questions of reflexivity and the subjectivity of the researcher; and the commitment to knowledge as emancipation” (2005, 4). Feminist scholarship is at once research and politics; this dualism forces feminist consideration of what it means to know and how we construct knowledge. In this consideration, feminists in IR have constructed a strong critique of the hegemony of positivist science in the analysis of global political and social relations. ‘Objective’ is no more than the subjective knowledge of privileged voices disguised as neutral (Harding 1998; Keller 1985; Goetz 1991). Privileged voices’ knowledges, though, are incomplete – representing only their unrepresentative experience (Scheman 1993, 211-2; Harding 1998). Yet this unrepresentativeness hides behind culturally assumed objectivity, where the privileged are licensed to think for everyone so long as they do so objectively**.** Feminisms critique this purported objectivity, recognizing instead that knowledge is always in part about the relationship between the knower and the known (Scheman 1993, 214). As Cynthia Enloe observed**,** “the personal is international and the international is personal”(**1**990, 195). Therefore, feminists understand knowledge is necessarily both contingent and interested. Contingency, interest, perspective, and politics are dimensions that the traditional “scientific method” is ill-equipped to consider. Feminism is “fundamentally a political act of commitment to understanding the world from the perspective of the socially subjugated” (Brown 1988, 472). As such, feminisms’ research goals and the “Occupy” methodology might have common interests and goals in terms of the politics of knowledge production and knowledge consumption. 27 We particularly find two ways where we think the method of “Occupation” might dovetail with the work of (feminist) IR, which we briefly sketch here. The first idea is that researchers occupy the uninhabitable space of liminality, particularly, the liminality of our research “subjects.” Recently, feminists have been thinking about what it means for the researcher’s body to be at risk and experience trauma in the research process, particularly in field research.6 We argue that this could be pushed further, towards thinking of occupation of/experience of liminal/uninhabitable space inhabited by IR’s traditional “research subjects” as itself a research method, where sense and emotion are the product and producer of research experiences. Living the liminality that we often ignore even when we write about the situation is a research experience – a way to reside in but outside of the dominant narrative of history/politics, a way to transgress the boundaries between research subject/object and researcher, and a way to understand the fundamental interdependence of the occupier and the occupied in research terms. The combined uncertainty of the observer (what is that?) and uncertainty in the consumption of the observed (how is that experienced?) of living liminality potentially provides the ability to inhabit the uninhabitable space of researcher-positioned-as-researched, breaking down the researcher/subject divide and providing space for the use of biopower to break down IR’s (disciplinary and research) sovereignties. This could be leveraged in support of feminisms’ interests in critical political knowledge production, anti-hierarchical transgression, and the creation of space for both research and political practice outside of the IR/neoliberal imperium(s).

### Debate Key

The K is a necessary corrective to the toxic masculinity of IR and debate – doing the K outside of its performance of direct clash with the aff doesn’t solve better

D’Costa, 2021 (Bina D'Costa is a Professor at the Department of International Relations, Coral Bell School of Asia-Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University. At the height of Europe’s refugee emergency, she moved to the UNICEF Office of Research-Innocenti to build its Migration and Displacement program (2016-2018). As a UN staff member, Bina has worked in South and Southeast Asia, Eastern and Southern Africa, and the Middle East. “Learning/unlearning in International Relations through the politics of margins and silence,”Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2021, Vol. 75, No. 6, 591-603; accessed through lib.umich.edu – Taylor and Francis Database; spp)

Why do I, trained in the discipline of International Relations (IR) reflect this way? What are the rewards and blind spots in the field for global South researchers based in Australia? In this essay, I describe this through three important and connected turns in my academic journey. First, learning about the politics of margins through the analyses of sexual and gender-based violence and justice; second, listening beyond the politics of silence through discussions of war crimes tribunals, culture of impunity, and militarisation; and third, unlearning both margins and silences, through research-based policy advocacy. Each of these turns is multi-layered in both their theoretical approaches and in their applied manifestation. To some extent, for AJIA readers, these might appear in the first instance to be very broad. For my career trajectory, as an academic and an activist, the gender-sensitive and feminist methodology (turn 1), enabled me to analytically unpack human rights-based justice issues and the double militarisation and diverse forms of silences and exclusion that women and marginalised communities experience (turn 2). It is not IR and feminist research only, but the global multi-disciplinary critical views about race and racism, gender, indigeneity, decolonial methods, and women, peace and security approaches, brought me to where I am now (turn 3). Why and how I turned these ways must also be because I am an Australian IR academic of South Asian descent. The debates about race and racism, prejudice, and decolonising knowledge in academia are compounded (and complicated) by everyday struggles of living as a woman of colour in Australia. Even tiny fractions of prejudicial encounters in the streets strip us of dignity that the University campus offers. These encounters are shared in hushed tones in safe spaces that people of colour (PoC) academics have created for themselves. However, these PoC spaces usually run parallel from the indigenous safe spaces and networks that nurture a relationship-based environment in Australian academia. As someone working with different kinds of communities, I had the privilege of observing some commonalities and some differences. In this essay, I reflect on these experiences. Learning about the politics of margins Feminist IR helped me with crucial methodological tools to speak about margins and marginalisation. I explained how through the symbolic use of women’s identities and bodies in national movements and, second, through the control of their sexuality after the conflict, women become doubly signified by the nation and the patriarchal state. The manipulation of gender relations is a major resource for claims to authority by the political elite who represent the state, in addition to defining the boundaries of the group to which loyalty is demanded. Analysis of gender relations explains; first, the ways in which states or nationalist movements utilise or deploy gender in the making of the nation, which often occurs through obedience and loyalty of its citizens; and second, the ways these processes impact those living in the margins, including minorities and non-elite women. When I first went to the United States in the mid-nineties to pursue higher education, I knew unclearly that I wanted to focus on mass atrocities and human rights violations, and the complex layers of justice. It didn’t occur to me to write about the 1971 war in South Asia. Not yet. Instead, I focussed on the Balkan region and wrote about Muslims, nationalism and SGBV in Bosnia. Critical feminist research was being published by feminist IR scholars and feminist legal theorists to explain the blind spots in studies of wars and violence. At the same time, global and regional policy advocacy campaigns were taking place through the Beijing Platform of Action and the Vienna Tribunal where women’s human rights activists were speaking up about state silences and injustices. While at first glance it could have felt far removed from North America “centric IR debates, in reality, debates about domestic violence, gender-based inequality, race and racism already started to appear in inter-disciplinary academic literature.My pathway as an IR academic has followed a different trajectory. Well versed in South Asian feminist literature, particularly by Begum Rokeya, Ashapurna Devi, Mahasweta Devi, Jahanara Imam and Nilima Ibrahim, and seeped into street-based campaign and human rights activism already, I began to read ground-breaking feminist literature and academic research relevant to IR. Through their writings, bell hooks, Audrey Lorde, Toni Morrison, Carolyn Nordstrom, Jindy Pettman, Brooke Ackerly, Ann Tickner, Cynthia Enloe, V Spike Peterson, and Kelly Askin broadened my horizon. I also read work by South Asian authors – Urvashi Butalia, Veena Das, Gaytatri Spivak, Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Salma Sobhan, and Hameeda Hossain. These feminist insights helped me to articulate some of the questions I had after reading mainstream IR about wars, national identity politics and nationalist movements. Feminist IR asked: why do scholars in the field of international relations need to pay attention to both nationalism and gender simultaneously? Former ANU academic Professor Jindy Pettman, one of the most critical thinkers of feminist IR and the founding editor of the International Feminist Journal of Politics noted, the disinterest of IR scholars in various political identities derived from the way the discipline was located in relation to the ‘in-between’ of states (Pettman 1998). At that time of Pettman’s writing, mainstream IR still overlooked the importance of women. Pettman argued that even a cursory look at nationalism’s construction and politics revealed their significance in marking the boundaries of difference, and both nation and nationalism were ‘constructed upon and through gender’ (1996, 45). In her analysis the predominant identity story became that of sovereignty, assuming a coincidence of authority, territory, population and identity, and ascribing primary loyalty through citizenship to the state … The territorialising logic and disciplinary power of the state have also bounded IR as a discipline. (Pettman 1998, 149)

### AT: Positivism Good

#### Positivism is self-serving and overdetermined by desires

Sjoberg and Chessman 2012 (Laura Sjoberg, PhD in IR from USC and Professor at UF, and Christian Chessman, JD UC Berk, "The Biopower of Occupation: Insights for ‘Knowledge Exchange’in (Gender and) IR,” November 17, 2012 http://genderinglobalgovernancenet-work.net/events/critical-reflections-on-the-researcher-practitioner-relationship-2/attachment/sjoberg-and-chessman-biopower-of-occupation (rishi)).

The second contribution we argue that “Occupy” as method could make to feminist research is in understanding research more generally as being stable in its liminality rather than anchored by a static certainty about ontology, epistemology, method, or field politics. One way to think about this might be thinking about IR as art, as Christine Sylvester suggests: It takes an eye for sex and gender to see the art of it all. Even then it is difficult. Surrounded by enchanted positivism, which promises progress in knowledge – yes, this is the way! – only a long learning curve has brought us to the point of X-raying and carbon-dating the facts presented as timeless tendencies, as ‘objective’ IR. If we do not journey along the learning curve, we end up trying to draw without looking, observing, and reckoning with life. (Sylvester 2002, 273) Sylvester is arguing that seeing the world in a way that is linear, rational, and exclusively scientific neglects a number of concerns which are normatively important to feminisms, which find their substance in the political, the personal, and the critical. At the same time, anchoring research in liminality contradicts the discipline’s anchoring in a positivist social science based on approximating certainty. As researchers, liminality-as-research-goal is another uninhabitable space in IR – one which might be physically inhabited as an embodied disruption of positivist social science – one which might be a space of otherness and a space of protest all at once – both providing new intellectual turf for IR and disrupting its operationaliity. 29 Occupying Research to Occupy (Feminist) IR We are interested in a number of ways that both research practice and the political landscape of the field might change as a result of the introduction of the methodological principles for performing research and navigating the field that we glean from the ideas and practices of the ‘Occupy’ movement. In our view, one of the most useful questions such an interpretation can ask is how the space of the need to ‘do/think things differently’ becomes/became less inhabitable/uninhabitable space in the discipline of IR/the practice of governance, and how to inhabit that uninhabitable space, methodologically for IR theory and practically for the world of governance? In the paper (ready for posting soon), we think of it in terms of the “perfect operationality” (in Baudrillard’s terms) of a simulacrum of ‘what IR is’ (or, in your terms ‘how to govern’) where the system and its normalized ‘opposition’ form a tight narrative of completeness that makes ‘otherness’ to it impossible. That narrative completeness relies on bodies being where they are ‘supposed’ to be (in Foucauldian terms about biopower being an enforcer of sovereignty), and re-placement of bodies (occupation) interrupts the narrative completeness of the imperium by demonstrating the inhabitability of uninhabitable space.

### Vulnerability = Ontological

Vulnerability is a byproduct of embodiement, and thus an ontological condition of humanity – within our worldview, vulnerability is coded as human and doesn’t always need to be guarded… not as a sign of feminine weakness

Vaittinen, 2018 (Tiina, Academy of Finland Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Global Health and Social Policy, Faculty of Social Sciences, Tampere University, Finland. “Embodied In/Security as Care Needs,” a chapter published in Carol Gentry, Laura J. Shepherd & Laura Sjoberg (eds.) Routledge Handbook in Gender and Security, spp)

**The lowest common denominator of embodiment** The body is ontologically multiple, which means that it is many things at the same time (Mol 2002). Feminist social theory, for instance, has examined the body as inscribed and discursively (re)produced (Grosz 1994; 1997; Dallery 1992; Butler 1993), but also as that which writes the world (Kirby 1997; Vaittinen forthcoming). The body is internally governed by gendered sex hormones, organic and synthetic alike (Irni 2013; Preciado, 2013), while simultaneously home to other bodies such as microbes (Fishel, 2015), or sometimes foetuses (Homanen 2013). As discussed above, the body is a vulnerable and destroyable target of violence, but also that which may violently destroy and explode the bodies of others (Wilcox, 2015). The body is differentially grievable (Butler 2004) and dis/abled (Shildrick, 2002; 2012; McRuer 2006). It is a gendered and sexual(ised) object of desire as well as trade (Agathangelou 2004; Penttinen 2008), while simultaneously subject to norms strictly tied to able-bodiedness and the two gender binary (Butler 1993; Smith 2013; Shildrick 2012; Repo 2015). The body is a space that extends towards other bodies, human and nonhuman alike (Haraway 1991), not only residing in space but also making space when exposed to/with other bodies (cf. Manning 2009). The human body can be *simultaneously all this*, and much more. It is not possible, in the space of this chapter or a lifetime, to discuss all these complementary ontologies of the body. Below, I thus focus on elaborating a particular conception of the body that applies to all living human beings at all times. I call this concept the lowest common denominator of embodiment (Vaittinen forthcoming). Its definition begins with the fact that all human bodies as organisms have certain fundamental, material needs, which make human beings existentially dependent on care provided by other bodies. In addition to breathing, *all* human bodies need be fed and hydrated, to digest, and get rid of excess fluids and excrement in an adequately hygienic way. When incapable of doing so independently, they need other bodies’ assistance in meeting these basic needs. In the course of a life-time, this makes all human bodies dependent on care provided by other bodies. While there may be also other fundamental needs, I refer to nutrition, hydration, urination, defecation, and hygiene, because these needs apply to *every single living/dying human body at all times*, regardless of age, gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, class, status, or any other attributes of identity or social position. Only at death are our bodies freed from this existential embodied dependency on other carnal beings – albeit even dead bodies tend to be subject to various practices of care, security and governance (cf. Auchter 2016). Of course, one can argue against the existential dependency on care by saying that we do not need concrete care from others throughout and at each moment of our lives. Yet (from a secular perspective at least) it is a fact that we only have one life, tied to one body organism, which can be prosthetically fixed and enhanced but only to a certain extent. If we look at the entire life-course of our embodiment, or do the same on level of populations, the periods of life when human beings are (presumably) independent from other bodies are limited to able-bodied adulthood (cf. McRuer 2006; Shildrick 2002; 2012). Taking this illusionary independent period of life as the norm leaves out innumerable lives, including our own lives at the times when we are frail, needy, and dependent. Yet, as shown by Cohn (2014) as well as by feminist care ethicists, in liberal politics and its security practices, invulnerability and independence *are* the norms, whilst those in need of care and protection are considered as exceptions. When human vulnerability is examined at the level of the lowest common denominator of embodiment, it becomes clearer still that, as for human bodies’ existential need of care, there are *no exceptions*, only difference. That all bodies are existentially dependent on care does not mean that all bodies would need the same care in the same way, or could demand it with the same power and the same ‘voice’. In the field of care needs too, there are power relations, with some vulnerable bodies being more powerful than others are, even as bare bodies in need of care (see Vaittinen 2015). This is because, in the prevailing material-discursive orders, some bodies’ are inscribed with value, eligibility to care and embodied security, while the care needs of others are turned into something incomprehensible and barely recognisable (Vaittinen forthcoming). Nevertheless, the body’s dependency on care given by other bodies is an ontology of human corporeality that, whether recognised or not, is present in all realistic ontologies of the body. It is the lowest common denominator. **Embodied in/security and its contending ontologies of relatedness** It is notable that, on the level of the lowest common denominator, the body and its leaky care needs are not about the feminine. After all, if we only just focus on the fact that everybody *must* eat, drink, urinate and defecate, maintain an adequate level of hygiene, and need care from others when not capable of doing so independently, the lowest common denominator of embodiment marks a space where telling the feminine from masculine is not self-evident (cf. Isaksen 2002; Vaittinen 2015). This fact of life applies as much to (cis)women as it does to (cis)men, as well as to the various bodies that do not fall into either of the dichotomously defined gender/sex categories. Hence, as living organisms, our bodies are not only always latently dependent on care provided by other bodies, but also fundamentally queer. It is even more notable that, in the era of the Anthropocene, human bodies and their influence are literally everywhere, as are therefore their leaky, disgust-materialist needs. Indeed, the fundamental leakiness and filth of human embodiment is also present in the military. Belkin (2012, 125172), for instance, has analysed the practices of filth and excremental self-control in the US army. Basham (2013, 87) in turn uses the loss of excremental self-control in the battle-field as an example of how the soldiers’ bodies, however disciplined, may sometimes resist their utilisation as the logistical vehicles of killing and being killed. She writes: In war […] it is not at all uncommon for servicemen to tremble, to sweat, to piss themselves, to vomit, or to shit their pants when they come under fire. […] When servicemen’s bodies do not perform as they have been disciplined to do, opportunities for puzzling out and critiquing how they are normally made intelligible become more apparent. My account of embodied in/security emerges from a very different empirical context from war and the military, namely the international politics of elderly care, and hence from social security rather than security ‘proper’ (Vaittinen forthcoming). Here, unlike in a context where the body loses excremental self-control when exposed to the direct violence of other bodies, the body’s existential leakiness denotes another type of relatedness with fellow carnal beings. This relatedness is about care, enacted by the body’s vulnerability to its own decay. As feminists have emphasised, this vulnerability – and the relatedness it necessitates with the Other – is something that just cannot be done away with. As argued above, from the most basic needs of the body (to eat, drink, urinate and defecate, and stay clean) follows that no human being can survive without care provided by other bodies. As in ethics of care, this inescapable neediness and dependency makes us always already latently related to and with other bodies  not antagonistically through the exposure to the embodied other’s violence as in many existing accounts of embodied in/security, but through care needs that only other human bodies can meet. Yet, whereas my lowest common denominator of embodiment emphasises the body’s existential need of care from other bodies for survival, the traditional premise of security studies is equally true: *all* living bodies at all times can also be killed by other bodies. In this regard, it may well be argued that the conventional security paradigms, including a range of feminist accounts, rely on another lowest common denominator of embodiment, namely the body’s existential exposure to external threats of violence  \_the Hobbesian world. Both these conceptions of embodied in/vulnerability are fundamentally relational. When one begins with care needs, the relations between people/bodies are defined in terms of nurturing and sustenance of life, both of which are absolutely necessary for the sustenance of our species. When one begins with the threat of external violence, our vulnerable bodies’ relations with each other become defined antagonistically, through the threat that the Other *might* pose. Ultimately at stake here are two contending gendered ontologies of human relatedness through which security policies can be shaped: feminised dependency on other bodies’ care, against the masculine perceptions of the bodies of others as primarily threatening. Both the ontologies are true descriptions of human embodiment, yet the security practices that they (re)produce are fundamentally different. When embodied in/security is defined merely through the threat of violence that other bodies might pose, what emerges is a masculine conception of security that disregards the threats that each body organism poses to itself by its very life. In these, largely prevailing conceptions of embodied in/security, care related questions such a disease, dis/ablement, birth, infancy, as well as the sheer decay of ageing appear as lesser security concerns, as do the more feminised functions of the state and global politics, such as social and health security. Yet, existentially and from the perspective of the species, it may well be that our need of care from other bodies is more real and true at all times, than the threat of violence posed by the bodies of the Other. What might security policies and practices look like, if they were based on what bodies actually are, rather than fears of what they might be? **Conclusion** The contemporary security policies and practices rely on a liberal, disembodied conception of human life, which is in many regards illusionary. In this chapter, I have shown how feminist analyses of care provide a convincing challenge to the hegemonic security discourses, by emphasising vulnerability as an existential condition of human life. This literature rarely explicitly discusses the body in its material carnality, however, which feminist security studies does, yet with a focus on direct violence that is external to the body. Consequently, in feminist security studies, too, the body organism’s vulnerability to its very own decay becomes overshadowed as a question of everyday embodied in/security. In this chapter, I have presented a parallel reading of feminist care theorists’ contributions to security studies on one hand, and feminist security studies discussions of embodied security on the other. Introducing the concept of lowest common denominator of embodiment, I suggest that the existential care needs of the body are inherent in all ontologies of the human body, and hence in all ontologies of embodied in/security. It is therefore crucial that care needs as a shared existential condition of human life be integrated in policies and practices of security, not just as an issue of ‘vulnerable groups’, or womenandchildren-and-thedisabledrest, but as something that applies to each and every human being. As long as this is not done, security policies and practices continue to build on an illusionary understanding of human life  \_that is, on an illusionary understanding of that which they claim to protect.